Doesn’t he distinguish between (1) and (2)? From the article:
Like most parents, I have a massive endowment effect vis-a-vis my children. I love them greatly simply because they exist and they’re mine. If you offered to replace one of my sons with another biological child who was better in every objective way, I’d definitely refuse.
Kinda, but—playing along with the assumption we’re all making, namely that he means what he says and isn’t just having fun—he makes the exact same mistake between steps 3 and 4 of his argument: he goes, explicitly, from “if you offered to replace one of my children with a better one I’d say no” to “I wouldn’t want anything in my past to be different because then I’d have different children”.
Changing something in his past wouldn’t be like taking away the children he now has and giving him replacements. It would mean change what children he’s always had.
Yes. Moreover, for a structural (as opposed to indexical) approach (i.e. closer to your #2), would he not have the predisposition to regret whatever bad decisions he made, even though the decisions led to him having the kids he has, he would be less likely to have the kids he has. (Because he would have made more severely bad decisions, etc.)
You’re right—in the counter-factual world where he jiggled his sperm and had a different child, he would value that child via the endowment effect. Thanks for clarifying for me.
Doesn’t he distinguish between (1) and (2)? From the article:
Kinda, but—playing along with the assumption we’re all making, namely that he means what he says and isn’t just having fun—he makes the exact same mistake between steps 3 and 4 of his argument: he goes, explicitly, from “if you offered to replace one of my children with a better one I’d say no” to “I wouldn’t want anything in my past to be different because then I’d have different children”.
Changing something in his past wouldn’t be like taking away the children he now has and giving him replacements. It would mean change what children he’s always had.
Yes. Moreover, for a structural (as opposed to indexical) approach (i.e. closer to your #2), would he not have the predisposition to regret whatever bad decisions he made, even though the decisions led to him having the kids he has, he would be less likely to have the kids he has. (Because he would have made more severely bad decisions, etc.)
You’re right—in the counter-factual world where he jiggled his sperm and had a different child, he would value that child via the endowment effect. Thanks for clarifying for me.