I think the distinction (and disjunction) between instrumental and terminal goals is an oversimplification, at least when applied to motivation (as you’ve demonstrated). My current understanding of goal-setting is that instrumental goals can also be terminal in the sense that one enjoys or is in the habit of doing them.
To take the rock star example: It’s not a lie to enjoy practicing or to enjoy making music, but it’s still true that making good at music is also instrumental to the goal of becoming a rock-star. I might say that making music as being instrumental and terminal, and becoming a rock star as terminal (or instead of terminal, directly instrumental to happiness / satisfaction / utility).
I suppose you’re not necessarily saying that the dark arts are irrational, since the optimal choice depends on the playing field. So I guess I agree, only that I still think that anything that lying to oneself is unnecessary, you just need more qualifying statements, like “I do indeed enjoy this and want to do this, and it so happens that it helps me achieve some other goal”.
Perhaps another way of describing the pitfall of avoiding the dark arts is confusing rationality with Straw Vulcan Rationality and failing to allow instrumental goals feel meaningful.
I suppose this doesn’t really work for something that is purely instrumental. Also, it doesn’t totally address your example for willful inconsistency, where it’d be very tempting to make excuses to work less hard. Or maybe not?
I’m still resistant to the idea that motivation is an illogical playing field, and think that you can be rational (that is, you can always recall the true belief when necessary) if you just use specific enough terminology. Like, differentiating oughts from statements of uncertainty, in your example of willful inconsistency—you ought to work really hard on AI alignment because of expected value. I guess here is where my resistance to motivation being illogical breaks down.
I think the distinction (and disjunction) between instrumental and terminal goals is an oversimplification, at least when applied to motivation (as you’ve demonstrated). My current understanding of goal-setting is that instrumental goals can also be terminal in the sense that one enjoys or is in the habit of doing them.
To take the rock star example: It’s not a lie to enjoy practicing or to enjoy making music, but it’s still true that making good at music is also instrumental to the goal of becoming a rock-star. I might say that making music as being instrumental and terminal, and becoming a rock star as terminal (or instead of terminal, directly instrumental to happiness / satisfaction / utility).
I suppose you’re not necessarily saying that the dark arts are irrational, since the optimal choice depends on the playing field. So I guess I agree, only that I still think that anything that lying to oneself is unnecessary, you just need more qualifying statements, like “I do indeed enjoy this and want to do this, and it so happens that it helps me achieve some other goal”.
Perhaps another way of describing the pitfall of avoiding the dark arts is confusing rationality with Straw Vulcan Rationality and failing to allow instrumental goals feel meaningful.
I suppose this doesn’t really work for something that is purely instrumental. Also, it doesn’t totally address your example for willful inconsistency, where it’d be very tempting to make excuses to work less hard. Or maybe not?
I’m still resistant to the idea that motivation is an illogical playing field, and think that you can be rational (that is, you can always recall the true belief when necessary) if you just use specific enough terminology. Like, differentiating oughts from statements of uncertainty, in your example of willful inconsistency—you ought to work really hard on AI alignment because of expected value. I guess here is where my resistance to motivation being illogical breaks down.