EDIT: Wow, this turned into a ramble. I didn’t have time to proof it so I apologize if it doesn’t make sense.
I’m not sure our guesses (I presume you have not tested the lottery ticket swap experimentally) are actually in conflict. My thesis was not “they think you’re cheating”, but simply, straightforwardly “they object to any alteration of the dealing rules”, and they might do so for the wrong reason—even though, in their defense, valid reasons exist.
Okay, yeah, that makes sense. My instinct is pointing me in the other direction namely because I have the (self perceived) benefit of knowing which friends of mine were objecting. Of note, no one openly accused me of cheating or anything like that. If I accidently dropped the deck on the floor or knocked it over the complaints would remain. The specific complaint, which I specifically asked for, is that their card was put into the middle of the deck.
(By the way, I do not think that claiming arrival at a valid complaint via the wrong reason is offering much defense for my friends.)
Your thesis, being narrow, is definitely of interest, though. I’m trying to think of cases where my thesis, interpreted naturally, would imply the opposite state of objection to yours. Poor shuffling (rule-stickler objects, my-cardist doesn’t) might work, but a lot of people don’t attend closely to whether cards are well-shuffled, stickler or not.
Any pseudo random event where people can (a) predict the undisclosed particular random object and (b) someone can voluntarily preempt that prediction and change the result tends to receive the same behavior.
(I presume you have not tested the lottery ticket swap experimentally)
I have not tested it in the sense that I sought to eliminate any form of weird contamination. But I have lots of anecdotal evidence. One such, very true, story:
My grandfather once won at bingo and was offered to choose a prize from a series of stuffed animals. Each animal was accompanied by an envelope containing some amount of cash. Amongst the animals were a turtle and a rhinoceros. Traditionally, he would always choose the turtle because he likes turtles but this time he picked the rhinoceros because my father happens to like rhinos. The turtle contained more money than the rhino and my dad got to hear about how he lost my grandfather money.
Granted, there are a handful of obvious holes in this particular story. The list includes:
My grandfather could have merely used it as an excuse to jab his son-in-law in the ribs (very likely)
My grandfather was lying (not likely)
The bingo organizers knew that rhinos were chosen more often than turtles (not likely)
My grandfather wasn’t very good at probability (likely, considering he was playing bingo)
Etc.
More stories like this have taught me to never muck with pseudo random variables whose outcomes effect things people care about even if the math behind the mucking doesn’t change anything. People who had a lottery ticket and traded it for a different equal chance will get extremely depressed because they actually “had a shot at winning.” These people could completely understand the probabilities involved, but somehow this doesn’t help them avoid the “what if” depression that tells them they shouldn’t have traded tickets.
People do this all the time involving things like when they left for work. Decades ago, my mother-in-law put her sister on a bus and the sister died when the bus crashed. “What if?” has dogged her ever since. The connection between the random chance of that particular bus crashing on that particular day is associated with her completely independent choice to put her sister on the bus. While they are mathematically independent, it doesn’t change the fact that her choice mattered. For some reason, people take this mattering and do things with it that makes no sense.
This topic can branch out into really weird places when viewed this way. The classic problem of someone holding 10 people hostage and telling you to kill 1 or all 10 die matches the pattern with a moral choice instead of random chance. When asking if it is more moral to kill 1 or let the 10 die people will argue that refusing to kill an innocent will result in 9 more people dying than needed. The decision matters and this mattering reflects on the moral value of each choice. Whether this is correct or not seems to be in debate and it is only loosely relevant for this particular topic. I am eagerly looking for the eventual answer to the question, “Are these events related?” But to get there I need to understand the simple scenario, which is the one presented by my original comment.
(Incidentally, If you had made a top-level post, I would want to see this kind of prediction-based elimination of alternative hypotheses.
I am having trouble understanding this. Can you say it again with different words?
(By the way, I do not think that claiming arrival at a valid complaint via the wrong reason is offering much defense for my friends.)
I’ll give you that one, with a caveat: if an algorithm consistently outputs correct data rather than incorrect, it’s a heuristic, not a bias. They lose points either way for failing to provide valid support for their complaint.
I have not tested it in the sense that I sought to eliminate any form of weird contamination. But I have lots of anecdotal evidence. One such, very true, story: [truncated for brevity]
Yes, those anecdotes constitute the sort of data I requested—your hypothesis now outranks mine in my sorting.
(Incidentally, If you had made a top-level post, I would want to see this kind of prediction-based elimination of alternative hypotheses.
I am having trouble understanding this. Can you say it again with different words?
When I read your initial comment, I felt that you had proposed an overly complicated explanation based on the amount of evidence you presented for it. I felt so based on the fact that I could immediately arrive at a simpler (and more plausible by my prior) explanation which your evidence did not refute. It is impressive, although not necessary, when you can anticipate my plausible hypothesis and present falsifying evidence; it is sufficient, as you have done, to test both hypotheses fairly against additional data when additional hypotheses appear.
Ah, okay. That makes more sense. I am still experimenting with the amount of predictive counter-arguing to use. In the past I have attempted to so by adding examples that would address the potential objections. This hasn’t been terribly successful. I have also directly addressed the points and people still brought them up… so I am pondering how to fix the problem.
But, anyway. The topic at hand still interests me. I assume there is a term for this that matches the behavior. I could come up with some fancy technical definition (perceived present ownership of a potential future ownership) but it seems dumb to make up a term when there is one lurking around somewhere. And the idea of labeling it an ownership problem didn’t really occur to me until my conversation with you… so maybe I am answering my own question slowly?
Something like “ownership” seems right, as well as the loss aversion issue. Somehow, this seemingly-irrational behavior seems perfectly natural to me (and I’m familiar with similar complaints about the order of cards coming out). If you look at it from the standpoint of causality and counterfactuals, I think it will snap into place...
Suppose that Tim was waiting for the king of hearts to complete his royal flush, and was about to be dealt that card. Then, you cut the deck, putting the king of hearts in the middle of the deck. Therefore, you caused him to not get the king of hearts; if your cutting of the deck were surgically removed, he would have had a straight flush.
Presumably, your rejoinder would be that this scenario is just as likely as the one where he would not have gotten the king of hearts but your cutting of the deck gave it to him. But note that in this situation the other players have just as much reason to complain that you caused Tim to win!
Of course, any of them is as likely to have been benefited or hurt by this cut, assuming a uniform distribution of cards, and shuffling is not more or less “random” than shuffling plus cutting.
A digression: But hopefully at this point, you’ll realize the difference between the frequentist and Bayesian instincts in this situation. The frequentist would charitably assume that the shuffle guarantees a uniform distribution, so that the cards each have the same probability of appearing on any particular draw. The Bayesian will symmetrically note that shuffling makes everyone involved assign the same probability to each card appearing on any particular draw, due to their ignorance of which ones are more likely. But this only works because everyone involved grants that shuffling has this property. You could imagine someone who payed attention to the shuffle and knew exactly which card was going to come up, and then was duly annoyed when you unexpectedly cut the deck. Given that such a person is possible in principle, there actually is a fact about which card each person ‘would have’ gotten under a standard method, and so you really did change something by cutting the deck.
A digression: But hopefully at this point, you’ll realize the difference between the frequentist and Bayesian instincts in this situation. [...]
Yep. This really is a digression which is why I hadn’t brought up another interesting example with the same group of friends:
One of my friends dealt hearts in a manner of giving each player a pack of three cards, the next player a pack of three cards and so on. The amount of cards being dealt were the same but we all complained that this actually affected the game because shuffling isn’t truly random and it was mucking with the odds.
We didn’t do any tests on the subject because we really just wanted the annoying kid to stop dealing weird. But, now that I think about it, it should be relatively easy to test...
Also related, I have learned a few magic tricks in my time. I understand that shuffling is a tricksy business. Plenty of more amusing stories are lurking about. This one is marginally related:
At a poker game with friends of friends there was one player who shuffled by cutting the cards. No riffles, no complicated cuts, just take a chunk from the top and put it on the bottom. Me and the mathematician friend from my first example told him to knock it off and shuffle the cards. He tried to convince us he was randomizing the deck. We told him to knock it off and shuffle the cards. He obliged while claiming that it really doesn’t matter.
This example is a counterpoint to the original. Here is someone claiming that it doesn’t matter when the math says it most certainly does. The aforementioned cheater-heuristic would have prevented this player from doing something Bad. I honestly have no idea if he was just lying to us or was completely clueless but I couldn’t help but be extremely suspicious when he ended up winning first place later that night.
On a tangent, myself and friends always pick the initial draw of cards using no particular method when playing Munchkin, to emphasize that we aren’t supposed to be taking this very seriously. I favor snatching a card off the deck just as someone else was reaching for it.
EDIT: Wow, this turned into a ramble. I didn’t have time to proof it so I apologize if it doesn’t make sense.
Okay, yeah, that makes sense. My instinct is pointing me in the other direction namely because I have the (self perceived) benefit of knowing which friends of mine were objecting. Of note, no one openly accused me of cheating or anything like that. If I accidently dropped the deck on the floor or knocked it over the complaints would remain. The specific complaint, which I specifically asked for, is that their card was put into the middle of the deck.
(By the way, I do not think that claiming arrival at a valid complaint via the wrong reason is offering much defense for my friends.)
Any pseudo random event where people can (a) predict the undisclosed particular random object and (b) someone can voluntarily preempt that prediction and change the result tends to receive the same behavior.
I have not tested it in the sense that I sought to eliminate any form of weird contamination. But I have lots of anecdotal evidence. One such, very true, story:
Granted, there are a handful of obvious holes in this particular story. The list includes:
My grandfather could have merely used it as an excuse to jab his son-in-law in the ribs (very likely)
My grandfather was lying (not likely)
The bingo organizers knew that rhinos were chosen more often than turtles (not likely)
My grandfather wasn’t very good at probability (likely, considering he was playing bingo)
Etc.
More stories like this have taught me to never muck with pseudo random variables whose outcomes effect things people care about even if the math behind the mucking doesn’t change anything. People who had a lottery ticket and traded it for a different equal chance will get extremely depressed because they actually “had a shot at winning.” These people could completely understand the probabilities involved, but somehow this doesn’t help them avoid the “what if” depression that tells them they shouldn’t have traded tickets.
People do this all the time involving things like when they left for work. Decades ago, my mother-in-law put her sister on a bus and the sister died when the bus crashed. “What if?” has dogged her ever since. The connection between the random chance of that particular bus crashing on that particular day is associated with her completely independent choice to put her sister on the bus. While they are mathematically independent, it doesn’t change the fact that her choice mattered. For some reason, people take this mattering and do things with it that makes no sense.
This topic can branch out into really weird places when viewed this way. The classic problem of someone holding 10 people hostage and telling you to kill 1 or all 10 die matches the pattern with a moral choice instead of random chance. When asking if it is more moral to kill 1 or let the 10 die people will argue that refusing to kill an innocent will result in 9 more people dying than needed. The decision matters and this mattering reflects on the moral value of each choice. Whether this is correct or not seems to be in debate and it is only loosely relevant for this particular topic. I am eagerly looking for the eventual answer to the question, “Are these events related?” But to get there I need to understand the simple scenario, which is the one presented by my original comment.
I am having trouble understanding this. Can you say it again with different words?
Have no fear—your comment is clear.
I’ll give you that one, with a caveat: if an algorithm consistently outputs correct data rather than incorrect, it’s a heuristic, not a bias. They lose points either way for failing to provide valid support for their complaint.
Yes, those anecdotes constitute the sort of data I requested—your hypothesis now outranks mine in my sorting.
When I read your initial comment, I felt that you had proposed an overly complicated explanation based on the amount of evidence you presented for it. I felt so based on the fact that I could immediately arrive at a simpler (and more plausible by my prior) explanation which your evidence did not refute. It is impressive, although not necessary, when you can anticipate my plausible hypothesis and present falsifying evidence; it is sufficient, as you have done, to test both hypotheses fairly against additional data when additional hypotheses appear.
Ah, okay. That makes more sense. I am still experimenting with the amount of predictive counter-arguing to use. In the past I have attempted to so by adding examples that would address the potential objections. This hasn’t been terribly successful. I have also directly addressed the points and people still brought them up… so I am pondering how to fix the problem.
But, anyway. The topic at hand still interests me. I assume there is a term for this that matches the behavior. I could come up with some fancy technical definition (perceived present ownership of a potential future ownership) but it seems dumb to make up a term when there is one lurking around somewhere. And the idea of labeling it an ownership problem didn’t really occur to me until my conversation with you… so maybe I am answering my own question slowly?
Something like “ownership” seems right, as well as the loss aversion issue. Somehow, this seemingly-irrational behavior seems perfectly natural to me (and I’m familiar with similar complaints about the order of cards coming out). If you look at it from the standpoint of causality and counterfactuals, I think it will snap into place...
Suppose that Tim was waiting for the king of hearts to complete his royal flush, and was about to be dealt that card. Then, you cut the deck, putting the king of hearts in the middle of the deck. Therefore, you caused him to not get the king of hearts; if your cutting of the deck were surgically removed, he would have had a straight flush.
Presumably, your rejoinder would be that this scenario is just as likely as the one where he would not have gotten the king of hearts but your cutting of the deck gave it to him. But note that in this situation the other players have just as much reason to complain that you caused Tim to win!
Of course, any of them is as likely to have been benefited or hurt by this cut, assuming a uniform distribution of cards, and shuffling is not more or less “random” than shuffling plus cutting.
A digression: But hopefully at this point, you’ll realize the difference between the frequentist and Bayesian instincts in this situation. The frequentist would charitably assume that the shuffle guarantees a uniform distribution, so that the cards each have the same probability of appearing on any particular draw. The Bayesian will symmetrically note that shuffling makes everyone involved assign the same probability to each card appearing on any particular draw, due to their ignorance of which ones are more likely. But this only works because everyone involved grants that shuffling has this property. You could imagine someone who payed attention to the shuffle and knew exactly which card was going to come up, and then was duly annoyed when you unexpectedly cut the deck. Given that such a person is possible in principle, there actually is a fact about which card each person ‘would have’ gotten under a standard method, and so you really did change something by cutting the deck.
Yep. This really is a digression which is why I hadn’t brought up another interesting example with the same group of friends:
We didn’t do any tests on the subject because we really just wanted the annoying kid to stop dealing weird. But, now that I think about it, it should be relatively easy to test...
Also related, I have learned a few magic tricks in my time. I understand that shuffling is a tricksy business. Plenty of more amusing stories are lurking about. This one is marginally related:
This example is a counterpoint to the original. Here is someone claiming that it doesn’t matter when the math says it most certainly does. The aforementioned cheater-heuristic would have prevented this player from doing something Bad. I honestly have no idea if he was just lying to us or was completely clueless but I couldn’t help but be extremely suspicious when he ended up winning first place later that night.
On a tangent, myself and friends always pick the initial draw of cards using no particular method when playing Munchkin, to emphasize that we aren’t supposed to be taking this very seriously. I favor snatching a card off the deck just as someone else was reaching for it.