That is in no way what was said. Also, the idea of an event that somehow manages to have no effect aside from being bad is… insanely contrived. More contrived than the dilemma itself.
However, let’s say that instead of 3^^^3 people getting dust in their eye, 3^^^3 people experience a single nano-second of despair, which is immediately erased from their memory to prevent any psychological damage. If I had a choice between that and torturing a person for 50 years, then I would probably choose the former.
That is in no way what was said. Also, the idea of an event that somehow manages to have no effect aside from being bad is… insanely contrived. More contrived than the dilemma itself.
The notion of 3^^^3 events of any sort is far more contrived than the elimination of knock-on effects of an event. There isn’t enough matter in the universe to make that many dust specks, let alone the eyes to be hit and nervous systems to experience it. Of course it’s contrived. It’s a thought experiment. I don’t assert that the original formulation makes it entirely clear; my point is to keep the focus on the actual relevant bit of the experiment—if you wander, you’re answering a less interesting question.
I don’t agree. The existence 3^^^3 people, or 3^^^3 dust specks, is impossible because there isn’t enough matter, as you said. The existence of an event that has only effects that are tailored to fit a particular person’s idea of ‘bad’ does not fit my model of how causality works. That seems like a worse infraction, to me.
However, all of that is irrelevant, because I answered the more “interesting question” in the comment you quoted. To be blunt, why are we still talking about this?
I don’t agree. The existence 3^^^3 people, or 3^^^3 dust specks, is impossible because there isn’t enough matter, as you said. The existence of an event that has only effects that are tailored to fit a particular person’s idea of ‘bad’ does not fit my model of how causality works. That seems like a worse infraction, to me.
I’m not sure I agree, but “which impossible thing is more impossible” does seem an odd thing to be arguing about, so I’ll not go into the reasons unless someone asks for them.
However, all of that is irrelevant, because I answered the more “interesting question” in the comment you quoted. To be blunt, why are we still talking about this?
I meant a more generalized you, in my last sentence. You in particular did indeed answer the more interesting question.
That is in no way what was said. Also, the idea of an event that somehow manages to have no effect aside from being bad is… insanely contrived. More contrived than the dilemma itself.
However, let’s say that instead of 3^^^3 people getting dust in their eye, 3^^^3 people experience a single nano-second of despair, which is immediately erased from their memory to prevent any psychological damage. If I had a choice between that and torturing a person for 50 years, then I would probably choose the former.
The notion of 3^^^3 events of any sort is far more contrived than the elimination of knock-on effects of an event. There isn’t enough matter in the universe to make that many dust specks, let alone the eyes to be hit and nervous systems to experience it. Of course it’s contrived. It’s a thought experiment. I don’t assert that the original formulation makes it entirely clear; my point is to keep the focus on the actual relevant bit of the experiment—if you wander, you’re answering a less interesting question.
I don’t agree. The existence 3^^^3 people, or 3^^^3 dust specks, is impossible because there isn’t enough matter, as you said. The existence of an event that has only effects that are tailored to fit a particular person’s idea of ‘bad’ does not fit my model of how causality works. That seems like a worse infraction, to me.
However, all of that is irrelevant, because I answered the more “interesting question” in the comment you quoted. To be blunt, why are we still talking about this?
I’m not sure I agree, but “which impossible thing is more impossible” does seem an odd thing to be arguing about, so I’ll not go into the reasons unless someone asks for them.
I meant a more generalized you, in my last sentence. You in particular did indeed answer the more interesting question.