What Metz did is not analogous to a straightforward accusation of cheating. Straightforward accusations are what I wish he did. What he did is the equivalent of angrily complain to mutual friends that your boyfriend liked an instagram post (of a sunset, but you leave that part out), by someone known to cheat (or maybe is just polyamorous, and you don’t consider there to be a distinction). If you made a straightforward accusation, your boyfriend could give a factual response. He’s not well incentivized to do so, but it’s possible. But if you’re very angry he liked an innocuous instagram post, what the hell can he say?
What Metz did is not analogous to a straightforward accusation of cheating. Straightforward accusations are what I wish he did.
It was quite straightforward, actually. Don’t be autistic about this: anyone reasonably informed who is reading the article knows what Scott is accused of thinking when Cade mentions Murray. He doesn’t make the accusation super explicit, but (a) people here would be angrier if he did, not less angry, and (b) that might actually pose legal issues for the NYT (I’m not a lawyer).
What Cade did reflects badly on Cade in the sense that it is very embarrassing to cite such weak evidence. I would never do that because it’s mortifying to make such a weak accusation.
However, Scott has no possible gripe here. Cade’s article makes embarrassing logical leaps, but the conclusion is true and the reporting behind the article (not featured in the article) was enough to show it true, so even a claim of being Gettier Cased does not work here.
This is reaching Cade Metz levels of slippery justification.
He doesn’t make the accusation super explicit, but (a) people here would be angrier if he did, not less angry
How is this relevant? As Elizabeth says, it would be more honest and epistemically helpful if he made an explicit accusation. People here might well be angry about that, but a) that’s not relevant to what is right and b) that’s because, as you admit, that accusation could not be substantiated. So how is it acceptable to indirectly insinuate that accusation instead?
(Also c), I think you’re mistaken in that prediction).
(b) that might actually pose legal issues for the NYT (I’m not a lawyer).
Relatedly, if you cannot outright make a claim because it is potentially libellous, you shouldn’t use vague insinuation to imply it to your massive and largely-unfamiliar-with-the-topic audience.
However, Scott has no possible gripe here.
You have yourself outlined several possible gripes. I’d have a gripe with someone dishonestly implying an enormously inflammatory accusation to their massive audience without any evidence for it, even if it were secretly true (which I still think you need to do more work to establish).
I think there are multiple further points to be made about why it’s unacceptable, outside of the dark side epistemology angle above. Here’s Scott’s direct response to exactly your accuastion, that despite Metz having been dishonest in his accusation, he does truly believe what Metz implied:
This is far enough from my field that I would usually defer to expert consensus, but all the studies I can find which try to assess expert consensus seem crazy. A while ago, I freaked out upon finding a study that seemed to show most expert scientists in the field agreed with Murray’s thesis in 1987 - about three times as many said the gap was due to a combination of genetics and environment as said it was just environment. Then I freaked out again when I found another study (here is the most recent version, from 2020) showing basically the same thing (about four times as many say it’s a combination of genetics and environment compared to just environment). I can’t find any expert surveys giving the expected result that they all agree this is dumb and definitely 100% environment and we can move on (I’d be very relieved if anybody could find those, or if they could explain why the ones I found were fake studies or fake experts or a biased sample, or explain how I’m misreading them or that they otherwise shouldn’t be trusted. If you have thoughts on this, please send me an email). I’ve vacillated back and forth on how to think about this question so many times, and right now my personal probability estimate is “I am still freaking out about this, go away go away go away”. And I understand I have at least two potentially irresolveable biases on this question: one, I’m a white person in a country with a long history of promoting white supremacy; and two, if I lean in favor then everyone will hate me, and use it as a bludgeon against anyone I have ever associated with, and I will die alone in a ditch and maybe deserve it. So the best I can do is try to route around this issue when considering important questions. This is sometimes hard, but the basic principle is that I’m far less sure of any of it than I am sure that all human beings are morally equal and deserve to have a good life and get treated with respect regardless of academic achievement.
I sort of agree that it’s quite plausible to infer from this that he does believe there are some between-group average differences that are genetic in origin. But I think it allows Scott several gripes with the Metz’ dishonest characterisation:
First of all, this is already significantly different, more careful and qualified than what Metz implied, and that’s after we read into it more than what Scott actually said. Does that count as “aligning yourself”?
Relatedly, even if Scott did truly believe exactly what Charles Murray does on this topic, which again I don’t think we can fairly assume, he hasn’t said that, and that’s important. Secretly believing something is different from openly espousing it, and morally it can be much different if one believes that openly espousing it could lead to it being used in harmful ways (which from the above, Scott clearly does, even in the qualified form which he may or may not believe). Scott is going to some lengths and being very careful not to espouse it openly and without qualification, and clearly believes it would be harmful to do so, so it’s clearly dishonest and misleading to suggest that he has “aligns himself” with Charles Murray on this topic. Again, this is even after granting the very shaky proposition that he secretly does align with Charles Murray, which I think we have established is a claim that cannot be substantiated.
Further, Scott, unlike Charles Murray, is very emphatic about the fact that, whatever the answer to this question, this should not affect our thinking on important issues or our treatment of anyone. Is this important addendum not elided by the idea that he ‘aligned himself’ with Charles Murray? Would not that not be a legitimate “gripe”?
And in case you or Metz would argue that those sentiments post-date the article in question, here’s an earlier Scott quote from ‘In Favor of Civilisation’:
Having joined liberal society, they can be sure that no matter what those researchers find, I and all of their new liberal-society buddies will fight tooth and nail against anyone who uses any tiny differences those researchers find to challenge the central liberal belief that everyone of every gender has basic human dignity. Any victory for me is going to be a victory for feminists as well; maybe not a perfect victory, but a heck of a lot better than what they have right now.
He’s talking about feminism and banning research into between-gender differences, there, but it and many other of Scott’s writings make it very clear that he supports equal treatment and moral consideration for all. Is this not an important detail for a journalist to include when making such an inflammatory insinuation, that could so easily be interpreted as implying the opposite?
Your position seems to amount to epistemic equivalent of ‘yes, the trial was procedurally improper, and yes the prosecutor deceived the jury with misleading evidence, and no the charge can’t actually be proven beyond a reasonable doubt- but he’s probably guilty anyway, so what’s the issue’. I think the issue is journalistic malpractice. Metz has deliberately misled his audience in order to malign Scott on a charge which you agree cannot be substantiated, because of his own ideological opposition (which he admits). To paraphrase the same SSC post quoted above, he has locked himself outside of the walled garden. And you are “Andrew Cord”, arguing that we should all stop moaning because it’s probably true anyway so the tactics are justified.
Relatedly, if you cannot outright make a claim because it is potentially libellous, you shouldn’t use vague insinuation to imply it to your massive and largely-unfamiliar-with-the-topic audience.
Strong disagree. If I know an important true fact, I can let people know in a way that doesn’t cause legal liability for me.
Can you grapple with the fact that the “vague insinuation” is true? Like, assuming it’s true and that Cade knows it to be true, your stance is STILL that he is not allowed to say it?
Your position seems to amount to epistemic equivalent of ‘yes, the trial was procedurally improper, and yes the prosecutor deceived the jury with misleading evidence, and no the charge can’t actually be proven beyond a reasonable doubt- but he’s probably guilty anyway, so what’s the issue’. I think the issue is journalistic malpractice. Metz has deliberately misled his audience in order to malign Scott on a charge which you agree cannot be substantiated, because of his own ideological opposition (which he admits). To paraphrase the same SSC post quoted above, he has locked himself outside of the walled garden. And you are “Andrew Cord”, arguing that we should all stop moaning because it’s probably true anyway so the tactics are justified.
It is not malpractice, because Cade had strong evidence for the factually true claim! He just didn’t print the evidence. The evidence was of the form “interview a lot of people who know Scott and decide who to trust”, which is a difficult type of evidence to put into print, even though it’s epistemologically fine (in this case IT LED TO THE CORRECT BELIEF so please give it a rest with the malpractice claims).
First of all, this is already significantly different, more careful and qualified than what Metz implied, and that’s after we read into it more than what Scott actually said. Does that count as “aligning yourself”?
This is because Scott is giving a maximally positive spin on his own beliefs! Scott is agreeing that Cade is correct about him! Scott had every opportunity to say “actually, I disagree with Murray about...” but he didn’t, because he agrees with Murray just like Cade said. And that’s fine! I’m not even criticizing it. It doesn’t make Scott a bad person. Just please stop pretending that Cade is lying.
Relatedly, even if Scott did truly believe exactly what Charles Murray does on this topic, which again I don’t think we can fairly assume, he hasn’t said that, and that’s important. Secretly believing something is different from openly espousing it, and morally it can be much different if one believes that openly espousing it could lead to it being used in harmful ways (which from the above, Scott clearly does, even in the qualified form which he may or may not believe). Scott is going to some lengths and being very careful not to espouse it openly and without qualification, and clearly believes it would be harmful to do so, so it’s clearly dishonest and misleading to suggest that he has “aligns himself” with Charles Murray on this topic. Again, this is even after granting the very shaky proposition that he secretly does align with Charles Murray, which I think we have established is a claim that cannot be substantiated.
Scott so obviously aligns himself with Murray that I knew it before that email was leaked or Cade’s article was written, as did many other people. At some point, Scott even said that he will talk about race/IQ in the context of Jews in order to ease the public into it, and then he published this. (I can’t find where I saw Scott saying it though.)
Further, Scott, unlike Charles Murray, is very emphatic about the fact that, whatever the answer to this question, this should not affect our thinking on important issues or our treatment of anyone. Is this important addendum not elided by the idea that he ‘aligned himself’ with Charles Murray? Would not that not be a legitimate “gripe”?
Actually, this is not unlike Charles Murray, who also says this should not affect our treatment of anyone. (I disagree with the “thinking on important issues” part, which Scott surely does think it affects.)
The vague insinuation isn’t “Scott agrees with Murray”, the vague insinuation is “Scott agrees with Murray’s deplorable beliefs, as shown by this reference”. The reference shows no such thing.
Arguing “well, Scott believes that anyway” is not an excuse for fake evidence.
Part of the appeal of Slate Star Codex, faithful readers said, was Mr. Siskind’s willingness to step outside acceptable topics. But he wrote in a wordy, often roundabout way that left many wondering what he really believed.
More broadly, part of the piece’s thesis is that the SSC community is the epicenter of a creative and influential intellectual movement, some of whose strengths come from a high tolerance for entertaining weird or disreputable ideas.
Metz is trying to convey how Alexander makes space for these ideas without staking his own credibility on them. This is, for example, what Kolmogorov Complicity is about; it’s also what Alexander says he’s doing with the neoreactionaries in his leaked email. It seems clear that Metz did enough reporting to understand this.
The juxtaposition of “Scott aligns himself with Murray [on something]” and “Murray has deplorable beliefs” specifically serves that thesis. It also pattern-matches to a very clumsy smear, which I get the impression is triggering readers before they manage to appreciate how it relates to the thesis. That’s unfortunate, because the “vague insinuation” is much less interesting and less defensible than the inference that Alexander is being strategic in bringing up Murray on a subject where it seems safe to agree with him.
It also pattern-matches to a very clumsy smear, which I get the impression is triggering readers before they manage to appreciate how it relates to the thesis.
It doesn’t just pattern match to a clumsy smear. It’s also not the only clumsy smear in the article. You’re acting as though that’s the only questionable thing Metz wrote and that taken in isolation you could read it in some strained way to keep it from being a smear. It was not published in isolation.
I think about it differently. When Scott does not support an idea, but discusses or allows discussion of it, it’s not “making space for ideas” as much as “making space for reasonable people who have ideas, even when they are wrong”. And I think making space for people to be wrong sometimes is good, important and necessary. According to his official (but confusing IMO) rules, saying untrue things is a strike against you, but insufficient for a ban.
Also, strong upvote because I can’t imagine why this question should score negatively.
It’s just a figure of speech for the sorts of thing Alexander describes in Kolmogorov Complicity. More or less the same idea as “Safe Space” in the NYT piece’s title—a venue or network where people can have the conversations they want about those ideas without getting yelled at or worse.
Mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov lived in the Soviet Union at a time when true freedom of thought was impossible. He reacted by saying whatever the Soviets wanted him to say about politics, while honorably pursuing truth in everything else. As a result, he not only made great discoveries, but gained enough status to protect other scientists, and to make occasional very careful forays into defending people who needed defending. He used his power to build an academic bubble where science could be done right and where minorities persecuted by the communist authorities (like Jews) could do their work in peace...
But politically-savvy Kolmogorov types can’t just build a bubble. They have to build a whisper network...
They have to serve as psychological support. People who disagree with an orthodoxy can start hating themselves – the classic example is the atheist raised religious who worries they’re an evil person or bound for Hell – and the faster they can be connected with other people, the more likely they are to get through.
They have to help people get through their edgelord phase as quickly as possible. “No, you’re not allowed to say this. Yes, it could be true. No, you’re not allowed to say this one either. Yes, that one also could be true as best we can tell. This thing here you actually are allowed to say still, and it’s pretty useful, so do try to push back on that and maybe we can defend some of the space we’ve still got left.”
They have to find at-risk thinkers who had started to identify holes in the orthodoxy, communicate that they might be right but that it could be dangerous to go public, fill in whatever gaps are necessary to make their worldview consistent again, prevent overcorrection, and communicate some intuitions about exactly which areas to avoid. For this purpose, they might occasionally let themselves be seen associating with slightly heretical positions, so that they stand out to proto-heretics as a good source of information. They might very occasionally make calculated strikes against orthodox overreach in order to relieve some of their own burdens. The rest of the time, they would just stay quiet and do good work in their own fields.
Could you (or someone else) summarize the other stuff, in the context of my question? I mean, I read it, there’s various things in there, but I’m not sure which of it is supposed to be a definition of “making space for” an idea.
Scott had every opportunity to say “actually, I disagree with Murray about...” but he didn’t, because he agrees with Murray
[citation needed] for those last four words. In the paragraph before the one frankybegs quoted, Scott said:
Some people wrote me to complain that I handled this in a cowardly way—I showed that the specific thing the journalist quoted wasn’t a reference to The Bell Curve, but I never answered the broader question of what I thought of the book. They demanded I come out and give my opinion openly. Well, the most direct answer is that I’ve never read it.
Having never read The Bell Curve, it would be uncharacteristic of him to say “I disagree with Murray about [things in The Bell Curve]”, don’t you think?
What Metz did is not analogous to a straightforward accusation of cheating. Straightforward accusations are what I wish he did. What he did is the equivalent of angrily complain to mutual friends that your boyfriend liked an instagram post (of a sunset, but you leave that part out), by someone known to cheat (or maybe is just polyamorous, and you don’t consider there to be a distinction). If you made a straightforward accusation, your boyfriend could give a factual response. He’s not well incentivized to do so, but it’s possible. But if you’re very angry he liked an innocuous instagram post, what the hell can he say?
It was quite straightforward, actually. Don’t be autistic about this: anyone reasonably informed who is reading the article knows what Scott is accused of thinking when Cade mentions Murray. He doesn’t make the accusation super explicit, but (a) people here would be angrier if he did, not less angry, and (b) that might actually pose legal issues for the NYT (I’m not a lawyer).
What Cade did reflects badly on Cade in the sense that it is very embarrassing to cite such weak evidence. I would never do that because it’s mortifying to make such a weak accusation.
However, Scott has no possible gripe here. Cade’s article makes embarrassing logical leaps, but the conclusion is true and the reporting behind the article (not featured in the article) was enough to show it true, so even a claim of being Gettier Cased does not work here.
This is reaching Cade Metz levels of slippery justification.
How is this relevant? As Elizabeth says, it would be more honest and epistemically helpful if he made an explicit accusation. People here might well be angry about that, but a) that’s not relevant to what is right and b) that’s because, as you admit, that accusation could not be substantiated. So how is it acceptable to indirectly insinuate that accusation instead?
(Also c), I think you’re mistaken in that prediction).
Relatedly, if you cannot outright make a claim because it is potentially libellous, you shouldn’t use vague insinuation to imply it to your massive and largely-unfamiliar-with-the-topic audience.
You have yourself outlined several possible gripes. I’d have a gripe with someone dishonestly implying an enormously inflammatory accusation to their massive audience without any evidence for it, even if it were secretly true (which I still think you need to do more work to establish).
I think there are multiple further points to be made about why it’s unacceptable, outside of the dark side epistemology angle above. Here’s Scott’s direct response to exactly your accuastion, that despite Metz having been dishonest in his accusation, he does truly believe what Metz implied:
I sort of agree that it’s quite plausible to infer from this that he does believe there are some between-group average differences that are genetic in origin. But I think it allows Scott several gripes with the Metz’ dishonest characterisation:
First of all, this is already significantly different, more careful and qualified than what Metz implied, and that’s after we read into it more than what Scott actually said. Does that count as “aligning yourself”?
Relatedly, even if Scott did truly believe exactly what Charles Murray does on this topic, which again I don’t think we can fairly assume, he hasn’t said that, and that’s important. Secretly believing something is different from openly espousing it, and morally it can be much different if one believes that openly espousing it could lead to it being used in harmful ways (which from the above, Scott clearly does, even in the qualified form which he may or may not believe). Scott is going to some lengths and being very careful not to espouse it openly and without qualification, and clearly believes it would be harmful to do so, so it’s clearly dishonest and misleading to suggest that he has “aligns himself” with Charles Murray on this topic. Again, this is even after granting the very shaky proposition that he secretly does align with Charles Murray, which I think we have established is a claim that cannot be substantiated.
Further, Scott, unlike Charles Murray, is very emphatic about the fact that, whatever the answer to this question, this should not affect our thinking on important issues or our treatment of anyone. Is this important addendum not elided by the idea that he ‘aligned himself’ with Charles Murray? Would not that not be a legitimate “gripe”?
And in case you or Metz would argue that those sentiments post-date the article in question, here’s an earlier Scott quote from ‘In Favor of Civilisation’:
He’s talking about feminism and banning research into between-gender differences, there, but it and many other of Scott’s writings make it very clear that he supports equal treatment and moral consideration for all. Is this not an important detail for a journalist to include when making such an inflammatory insinuation, that could so easily be interpreted as implying the opposite?
Your position seems to amount to epistemic equivalent of ‘yes, the trial was procedurally improper, and yes the prosecutor deceived the jury with misleading evidence, and no the charge can’t actually be proven beyond a reasonable doubt- but he’s probably guilty anyway, so what’s the issue’. I think the issue is journalistic malpractice. Metz has deliberately misled his audience in order to malign Scott on a charge which you agree cannot be substantiated, because of his own ideological opposition (which he admits). To paraphrase the same SSC post quoted above, he has locked himself outside of the walled garden. And you are “Andrew Cord”, arguing that we should all stop moaning because it’s probably true anyway so the tactics are justified.
Strong disagree. If I know an important true fact, I can let people know in a way that doesn’t cause legal liability for me.
Can you grapple with the fact that the “vague insinuation” is true? Like, assuming it’s true and that Cade knows it to be true, your stance is STILL that he is not allowed to say it?
It is not malpractice, because Cade had strong evidence for the factually true claim! He just didn’t print the evidence. The evidence was of the form “interview a lot of people who know Scott and decide who to trust”, which is a difficult type of evidence to put into print, even though it’s epistemologically fine (in this case IT LED TO THE CORRECT BELIEF so please give it a rest with the malpractice claims).
Here is the evidence of Scott’s actual beliefs:
https://twitter.com/ArsonAtDennys/status/1362153191102677001
As for your objections:
This is because Scott is giving a maximally positive spin on his own beliefs! Scott is agreeing that Cade is correct about him! Scott had every opportunity to say “actually, I disagree with Murray about...” but he didn’t, because he agrees with Murray just like Cade said. And that’s fine! I’m not even criticizing it. It doesn’t make Scott a bad person. Just please stop pretending that Cade is lying.
Scott so obviously aligns himself with Murray that I knew it before that email was leaked or Cade’s article was written, as did many other people. At some point, Scott even said that he will talk about race/IQ in the context of Jews in order to ease the public into it, and then he published this. (I can’t find where I saw Scott saying it though.)
Actually, this is not unlike Charles Murray, who also says this should not affect our treatment of anyone. (I disagree with the “thinking on important issues” part, which Scott surely does think it affects.)
The vague insinuation isn’t “Scott agrees with Murray”, the vague insinuation is “Scott agrees with Murray’s deplorable beliefs, as shown by this reference”. The reference shows no such thing.
Arguing “well, Scott believes that anyway” is not an excuse for fake evidence.
That section is framed with
More broadly, part of the piece’s thesis is that the SSC community is the epicenter of a creative and influential intellectual movement, some of whose strengths come from a high tolerance for entertaining weird or disreputable ideas.
Metz is trying to convey how Alexander makes space for these ideas without staking his own credibility on them. This is, for example, what Kolmogorov Complicity is about; it’s also what Alexander says he’s doing with the neoreactionaries in his leaked email. It seems clear that Metz did enough reporting to understand this.
The juxtaposition of “Scott aligns himself with Murray [on something]” and “Murray has deplorable beliefs” specifically serves that thesis. It also pattern-matches to a very clumsy smear, which I get the impression is triggering readers before they manage to appreciate how it relates to the thesis. That’s unfortunate, because the “vague insinuation” is much less interesting and less defensible than the inference that Alexander is being strategic in bringing up Murray on a subject where it seems safe to agree with him.
It doesn’t just pattern match to a clumsy smear. It’s also not the only clumsy smear in the article. You’re acting as though that’s the only questionable thing Metz wrote and that taken in isolation you could read it in some strained way to keep it from being a smear. It was not published in isolation.
What does it mean to “make space for” some idea(s)?
I think about it differently. When Scott does not support an idea, but discusses or allows discussion of it, it’s not “making space for ideas” as much as “making space for reasonable people who have ideas, even when they are wrong”. And I think making space for people to be wrong sometimes is good, important and necessary. According to his official (but confusing IMO) rules, saying untrue things is a strike against you, but insufficient for a ban.
Also, strong upvote because I can’t imagine why this question should score negatively.
It’s just a figure of speech for the sorts of thing Alexander describes in Kolmogorov Complicity. More or less the same idea as “Safe Space” in the NYT piece’s title—a venue or network where people can have the conversations they want about those ideas without getting yelled at or worse.
So, basically, allowing the ideas in question to be discussed on one’s blog/forum/whatever, instead of banning people for discussing them?
Yeah, plus all the other stuff Alexander and Metz wrote about it, I guess.
Could you (or someone else) summarize the other stuff, in the context of my question? I mean, I read it, there’s various things in there, but I’m not sure which of it is supposed to be a definition of “making space for” an idea.
[citation needed] for those last four words. In the paragraph before the one frankybegs quoted, Scott said:
Having never read The Bell Curve, it would be uncharacteristic of him to say “I disagree with Murray about [things in The Bell Curve]”, don’t you think?
Actually one does need to read The Bell Curve to know what’s in it. There’s a lot of slander going around about it.