Yes, and I often see stark examples of how this difference in psychology reveals itself. It typically involves a NT joking about the observed behavior of an AS, where the “funny” bit takes the form, “[AS person] performed [action X], when you’re OBVIOUSLY supposed to do ~X, though I am completely incapable of saying how ~X inexorably follows as the right one based on typical social experience.”
Real example (some details may be off) that’s representative of what I see a lot: “Yeah, there’s this real weird kid in this class I teach who had read about the Protestant Reformation, but get this—he actually pronounced it ‘pro-TEST-ant’! It was SO funny [because obviously English has a really rigorous orthography that’s designed to prevent this kind of thing]!”
I would like to see Eliezer Yudkowsky address the issues raised by NT/AS and by this book, because his position does have a lot of tension with it, even if there’s no direct contradiction. (I’m guessing he can dismiss the NT/AS issues a being relatively small in the grand scheme of things.)
It was SO funny [because obviously English has a really rigorous orthography that’s designed to prevent this kind of thing]!”
I’m pretty sure that’s not how that sort of neurotypical is thinking. It’s more like “of course everyone is always alert to get the social details right, and it’s shocking incompetence to fall down on the job!”.
If so, we’re back to psychological unity of the human race—geeks sneering at people who can’t manage to understand completely obvious things about computers are showing the same lack of imagination.
I’m pretty sure that’s not how that sort of neurotypical is thinking. It’s more like “of course everyone is always alert to get the social details right, and it’s shocking incompetence to fall down on the job!”.
My point was that such instances reveal psychological diversity, and the characterization of such a mistake as incompetence is the proof of diversity, so I don’t see how that contradicts my point. With psychological unity, people might still see it as funny (maybe because pro-TEST-ant is a weird sound), but not on the basis of it revealing incompetence.
If so, we’re back to psychological unity of the human race—geeks sneering at people who can’t manage to understand completely obvious things about computers are showing the same lack of imagination.
If you’re saying that geeks laugh at how non-geeks fail to make the correct inference about computers from the same experience, that looks like more evidence of psychological diversity.
My point was that it’s common for people to think of their own skills as normal, and to think it’s ridiculous when other people don’t have those skills.
The skills may be different, but the assumption that everyone should have at least moderate skill at what comes easy to you is the same.
The skills may be different, but the assumption that everyone should have at least moderate skill at what comes easy to you is the same.
And the belief that “Y, rather than Z is the obvious inference given X ” is different across people, and is evidence of psychological diversity, and is the case frequently, including here. The universal presence of a belief of the form “You should have moderate skill at X” does not contradict this.
If Oceanians consider Eur...Eastasians, their mortal enemies, unworthy of human dignity, and Eastasians regard Oceanians, their hated antagonists, as little more than maggots to be crushed, then that is not an example of psychological diversity; instead, it’s two different instances of underlying psychological unity—in this case, of the universal “Us vs. Them” heuristic.
But this doesn’t map to an “us vs. them” heuristic; it maps to an “X implies Y vs. X implies ~Y”. The fact that the differing beliefs about what X implies leads to a universal dislike of the “other” does not deny the neurodiversity in the former heuristic.
Yes but the term “psychological unity” is about hardware. Neurodiversity in terms of magazine selection does not necessarily have a genetic link even though it will show that we are neurodiverse. Difference in magazine selection can lead to a difference in what one believes X implies.
Perhaps someone could outline the perceived tension in more detail? We already knew humans weren’t identical. So just how much variation is how much of a problem for what?
Yes, and I often see stark examples of how this difference in psychology reveals itself. It typically involves a NT joking about the observed behavior of an AS, where the “funny” bit takes the form, “[AS person] performed [action X], when you’re OBVIOUSLY supposed to do ~X, though I am completely incapable of saying how ~X inexorably follows as the right one based on typical social experience.”
Real example (some details may be off) that’s representative of what I see a lot: “Yeah, there’s this real weird kid in this class I teach who had read about the Protestant Reformation, but get this—he actually pronounced it ‘pro-TEST-ant’! It was SO funny [because obviously English has a really rigorous orthography that’s designed to prevent this kind of thing]!”
I would like to see Eliezer Yudkowsky address the issues raised by NT/AS and by this book, because his position does have a lot of tension with it, even if there’s no direct contradiction. (I’m guessing he can dismiss the NT/AS issues a being relatively small in the grand scheme of things.)
I’m pretty sure that’s not how that sort of neurotypical is thinking. It’s more like “of course everyone is always alert to get the social details right, and it’s shocking incompetence to fall down on the job!”.
If so, we’re back to psychological unity of the human race—geeks sneering at people who can’t manage to understand completely obvious things about computers are showing the same lack of imagination.
My point was that such instances reveal psychological diversity, and the characterization of such a mistake as incompetence is the proof of diversity, so I don’t see how that contradicts my point. With psychological unity, people might still see it as funny (maybe because pro-TEST-ant is a weird sound), but not on the basis of it revealing incompetence.
If you’re saying that geeks laugh at how non-geeks fail to make the correct inference about computers from the same experience, that looks like more evidence of psychological diversity.
My point was that it’s common for people to think of their own skills as normal, and to think it’s ridiculous when other people don’t have those skills.
The skills may be different, but the assumption that everyone should have at least moderate skill at what comes easy to you is the same.
And the belief that “Y, rather than Z is the obvious inference given X ” is different across people, and is evidence of psychological diversity, and is the case frequently, including here. The universal presence of a belief of the form “You should have moderate skill at X” does not contradict this.
If Oceanians consider Eur...Eastasians, their mortal enemies, unworthy of human dignity, and Eastasians regard Oceanians, their hated antagonists, as little more than maggots to be crushed, then that is not an example of psychological diversity; instead, it’s two different instances of underlying psychological unity—in this case, of the universal “Us vs. Them” heuristic.
But this doesn’t map to an “us vs. them” heuristic; it maps to an “X implies Y vs. X implies ~Y”. The fact that the differing beliefs about what X implies leads to a universal dislike of the “other” does not deny the neurodiversity in the former heuristic.
Yes but the term “psychological unity” is about hardware. Neurodiversity in terms of magazine selection does not necessarily have a genetic link even though it will show that we are neurodiverse. Difference in magazine selection can lead to a difference in what one believes X implies.
People are not necessarily born with their current skill set, though, yes?
Upvoted for pointing this out.
Perhaps someone could outline the perceived tension in more detail? We already knew humans weren’t identical. So just how much variation is how much of a problem for what?