For games without these mechanisms, the rational outcomes don’t end up that pleasant. Except sometimes, with players who have extra-rational motives.
I think we agree that if a selfish agent needs to be forced to not treat others poorly, in the absence of such enforcement they will treat others poorly.
It also seems like in many cases, selfish agents have an incentive to create exactly those mechanisms ensuring good outcomes for everyone, because it leads to good outcomes for them in particular. A nation-state comprised entirely of very selfish people would look a lot different from any modern country, but they face the same instrumental reasons to pool resources to enforce laws. The more inclined their populace is towards mistreatment in the absence of enforcement, the higher those enforcement costs need to be in order to achieve the same level of good treatment.
I also think “fairness” is a Schelling point that even selfish agents can agree to coordinate around, in a way that they could never be aligned on “maximizing Zaire’s utility in particular.” They don’t need to value fairness directly to agree that “an equal split of resources is the only compromise we’re all going to agree on during this negotiation.”
So I think my optimism comes from at least two places:
Even utterly selfish agents still have an incentive to create mechanisms enforcing good outcomes for everyone.
People have at least some altruism, and are willing to pay costs to prevent mistreatment of others in many cases.
I think we agree that if a selfish agent needs to be forced to not treat others poorly, in the absence of such enforcement they will treat others poorly.
It also seems like in many cases, selfish agents have an incentive to create exactly those mechanisms ensuring good outcomes for everyone, because it leads to good outcomes for them in particular. A nation-state comprised entirely of very selfish people would look a lot different from any modern country, but they face the same instrumental reasons to pool resources to enforce laws. The more inclined their populace is towards mistreatment in the absence of enforcement, the higher those enforcement costs need to be in order to achieve the same level of good treatment.
I also think “fairness” is a Schelling point that even selfish agents can agree to coordinate around, in a way that they could never be aligned on “maximizing Zaire’s utility in particular.” They don’t need to value fairness directly to agree that “an equal split of resources is the only compromise we’re all going to agree on during this negotiation.”
So I think my optimism comes from at least two places:
Even utterly selfish agents still have an incentive to create mechanisms enforcing good outcomes for everyone.
People have at least some altruism, and are willing to pay costs to prevent mistreatment of others in many cases.