Humans have a mechanism that allows that them have experiences (as if) of things that aren’t there, which is employed in dreaming, visualisation and hallucination. Whether that mechanism is also involved in veridical perception is a perfectly valid empirical question. It can be settled by science.
There is an issue about whether perception is defined in a way that absolutely requires a real object of perception. That is an entirely semantic issue. You can solve it without performing experiments. (Or just side step it by using different words for veridical perception and other kinds).
There is also a much thornier,and much more genuinely philosophical question about how much veridical perception is influenced by perceptual mechanisms and cognitive frameworks. Naive realism says “zero” but naive realism is scientifically false.
There’s a sense in which debates over the concept “perception” are purely conceptual, but they’re not just a matter of using a different word. This is what I was getting at by cognitive qualia: conceptual debates can shape how you experience the world.
There’s a sense in which debates over the concept “perception” are purely conceptual
I never asserted that they were.
What’s the difference between conceiving differently and mapping differently? Not a lot. In the special case where two maps have identical structures, they slice-and-dice the territory identically, then it doesn’t much matter how you label the components.
In every other case, conceiving differently is mapping differently.
“Direct perception” and “indirect perception” aren’t just equivalent labels for the same structure, they indicate different structures, a two stage one , and a three state one. They work the same end-to-end, as blank boxes … but we are not limited to viewing perception as a black box, we can peak inside using brain scanners.
Direct and indirect perception are different maps that can succeed or fail in corresponding to the territory, and we can check that.
This is what I was getting at by cognitive qualia: conceptual debates can shape how you experience the world.
That may be the case, but it doesn’t mean all the other issues are purely conceptual.
Humans have a mechanism that allows that them have experiences (as if) of things that aren’t there, which is employed in dreaming, visualisation and hallucination. Whether that mechanism is also involved in veridical perception is a perfectly valid empirical question. It can be settled by science.
There is an issue about whether perception is defined in a way that absolutely requires a real object of perception. That is an entirely semantic issue. You can solve it without performing experiments. (Or just side step it by using different words for veridical perception and other kinds).
There is also a much thornier,and much more genuinely philosophical question about how much veridical perception is influenced by perceptual mechanisms and cognitive frameworks. Naive realism says “zero” but naive realism is scientifically false.
There’s a sense in which debates over the concept “perception” are purely conceptual, but they’re not just a matter of using a different word. This is what I was getting at by cognitive qualia: conceptual debates can shape how you experience the world.
I never asserted that they were.
What’s the difference between conceiving differently and mapping differently? Not a lot. In the special case where two maps have identical structures, they slice-and-dice the territory identically, then it doesn’t much matter how you label the components.
In every other case, conceiving differently is mapping differently.
“Direct perception” and “indirect perception” aren’t just equivalent labels for the same structure, they indicate different structures, a two stage one , and a three state one. They work the same end-to-end, as blank boxes … but we are not limited to viewing perception as a black box, we can peak inside using brain scanners.
Direct and indirect perception are different maps that can succeed or fail in corresponding to the territory, and we can check that.
That may be the case, but it doesn’t mean all the other issues are purely conceptual.