The counterargument I’ve read in earlier (“unreal”) discussions on the subject is, roughly, that people who claim their support for SIAI is contingent on additional facts, analyses, or whatever are simply wrong… that whatever additional data is provided along those lines won’t actually convince them, it will merely cause them to ask for different data.
While the unpleasant readings are certainly readily available, more neutral readings are available as well.
By way of analogy: it’s a common relationship trope that suitors who insist on proof of my love and fidelity won’t be satisfied with any proofs I can provide. OTOH, it’s also a common trope that suitors who insist that I should trust in their love and fidelity without evidence don’t have them to offer in the first place.
If people who ask me a certain type of question aren’t satisfied with the answer I have, I can either look for different answers or for different people; which strategy I pick depends on the specifics of the situation. If I want to infer something about someone else based on their choice of strategy I similarly have to look into the specifics of the situation. IME there is no royal road to the right answer here.
Yes, absolutely, I read your comment as understatement… but if you meant it literally, I’m curious as to the whole context of your comment.
For example, what do you mean to contrast that counterargument with? That is: what’s an example of an argument for which the motives for assuming it are actively pleasant? What follows from their pleasantness?
That is: what’s an example of an argument for which the motives for assuming it are actively pleasant? What follows from their pleasantness?
A policy like “assume good faith” strikes me as coming from not unpleasant motives. What follows is that you should attribute a higher probability of good faith to someone who assumes good faith. If someone assumes that other people cannot be convinced by evidence, my knowledge of projection suggests that should increase my probability estimate that they cannot be convinced by evidence.
That doesn’t entirely answer your question- since I talked about policies and you’re talking about motives- but it should suggest an answer. Policies and statements represent a distribution of sets of possible motives, and so while the motives themselves unambiguously tell you how to respond the policies just suggest good guesses. But, in general, pleasantness begets pleasantness and unpleasantness begets unpleasantness.
There are a large number of possible motives that could lead to assuming that the people in question are simply wrong. None of them are particularly pleasant (but not all of them are unpleasant). I don’t need to know which motivates them in order to make the statement I made. However, the statement as paraphrased by TheOtherDave is much more specific; hence the difficulty.
As a more general comment, I strongly approve of people kicking tires, even if they’re mine. When I see someone who doesn’t have similar feelings, I can’t help but wonder why. Like with my earlier comment, not all the reasons are unpleasant. But some are.
The counterargument I’ve read in earlier (“unreal”) discussions on the subject is, roughly, that people who claim their support for SIAI is contingent on additional facts, analyses, or whatever are simply wrong… that whatever additional data is provided along those lines won’t actually convince them, it will merely cause them to ask for different data.
I assume you’re referring to Is That Your True Rejection?.
(nods) I think so, yes.
This strikes me as a difficult thing to know, and the motives that lead to assuming it are not particularly pleasant.
While the unpleasant readings are certainly readily available, more neutral readings are available as well.
By way of analogy: it’s a common relationship trope that suitors who insist on proof of my love and fidelity won’t be satisfied with any proofs I can provide. OTOH, it’s also a common trope that suitors who insist that I should trust in their love and fidelity without evidence don’t have them to offer in the first place.
If people who ask me a certain type of question aren’t satisfied with the answer I have, I can either look for different answers or for different people; which strategy I pick depends on the specifics of the situation. If I want to infer something about someone else based on their choice of strategy I similarly have to look into the specifics of the situation. IME there is no royal road to the right answer here.
It is a shame that understatement is so common it’s hard to be precise quickly; I meant to include neutral readings in “not particularly pleasant.”
Huh. Interesting.
Yes, absolutely, I read your comment as understatement… but if you meant it literally, I’m curious as to the whole context of your comment.
For example, what do you mean to contrast that counterargument with? That is: what’s an example of an argument for which the motives for assuming it are actively pleasant? What follows from their pleasantness?
A policy like “assume good faith” strikes me as coming from not unpleasant motives. What follows is that you should attribute a higher probability of good faith to someone who assumes good faith. If someone assumes that other people cannot be convinced by evidence, my knowledge of projection suggests that should increase my probability estimate that they cannot be convinced by evidence.
That doesn’t entirely answer your question- since I talked about policies and you’re talking about motives- but it should suggest an answer. Policies and statements represent a distribution of sets of possible motives, and so while the motives themselves unambiguously tell you how to respond the policies just suggest good guesses. But, in general, pleasantness begets pleasantness and unpleasantness begets unpleasantness.
It strikes me as a tendency that can either be observed as a trend or noted to be absent.
This strikes meas a difficult thing to know. And distastefully ironic.
There are a large number of possible motives that could lead to assuming that the people in question are simply wrong. None of them are particularly pleasant (but not all of them are unpleasant). I don’t need to know which motivates them in order to make the statement I made. However, the statement as paraphrased by TheOtherDave is much more specific; hence the difficulty.
As a more general comment, I strongly approve of people kicking tires, even if they’re mine. When I see someone who doesn’t have similar feelings, I can’t help but wonder why. Like with my earlier comment, not all the reasons are unpleasant. But some are.