My answer to this is that integrity is a virtue, and breaking one’s promises reduces one’s integrity. And being a person with integrity is vital to the good life.
Then I repeat the question with MBlume’s corrections, to make the problem less convenient. Would you still follow up and murder 15 people, to preserve your personal integrity? It’s not a question of values, it’s a question of decision theory.
The point is that the distinction between $0.02 and a trillion lives is irrelevant to the discussion, which is about the structure of preference order assigned to actions, whatever your values are. If you are determined to pay off Omega, the reason for that must be in your decision algorithm, not in an exquisite balance between $100, personal integrity, and murder. If you are willing to carry the deal through (note that there isn’t even any deal, only your premeditated decision), the reason for that must lie elsewhere, not in the value of personal integrity.
To make that claim, you do need to first establish that he would accept a bet of 15 lives vs some reward in the first place, which I think is what he is claiming he would not do. There’s a difference between making a bet and reneging, and not accepting the bet. If you would not commit murder to save a million lives in the first place, then the refusal is for a different reason than just the fact that the stakes are raised.
The values aren’t necessarily relevant after I’ve precommitted to the bet, but they’re absolutely relevant to whether I’d precommit to the bet. If murder is one of the options, count me out.
My reason for carrying the deal through is (partially) that it promotes virtue. I do not see any arguments that it cannot be so.
What’s vague? Let me try to spell this out in excruciating detail:
Making good on one’s commitments promotes the virtue of integrity. Integrity is constitutive of good character. One cannot consistently act as a person of good character without having it. To act ethically is to act as a person of good character does. Ethics specifies what one has most reason to do or want.
So, if you ask me what I have most reason to do in a circumstance where I’ve made a commitment, ceteris paribus, I’ll respond that I’ll make good on my commitments.
My answer to this is that integrity is a virtue, and breaking one’s promises reduces one’s integrity. And being a person with integrity is vital to the good life.
Then I repeat the question with MBlume’s corrections, to make the problem less convenient. Would you still follow up and murder 15 people, to preserve your personal integrity? It’s not a question of values, it’s a question of decision theory.
This thread assumes a precommitment. I would not precommit to murder.
I’m not sure what your point is here.
The point is that the distinction between $0.02 and a trillion lives is irrelevant to the discussion, which is about the structure of preference order assigned to actions, whatever your values are. If you are determined to pay off Omega, the reason for that must be in your decision algorithm, not in an exquisite balance between $100, personal integrity, and murder. If you are willing to carry the deal through (note that there isn’t even any deal, only your premeditated decision), the reason for that must lie elsewhere, not in the value of personal integrity.
To make that claim, you do need to first establish that he would accept a bet of 15 lives vs some reward in the first place, which I think is what he is claiming he would not do. There’s a difference between making a bet and reneging, and not accepting the bet. If you would not commit murder to save a million lives in the first place, then the refusal is for a different reason than just the fact that the stakes are raised.
Integrity is a virtue, not a value.
The values aren’t necessarily relevant after I’ve precommitted to the bet, but they’re absolutely relevant to whether I’d precommit to the bet. If murder is one of the options, count me out.
My reason for carrying the deal through is (partially) that it promotes virtue. I do not see any arguments that it cannot be so.
Too vague.
What’s vague? Let me try to spell this out in excruciating detail:
Making good on one’s commitments promotes the virtue of integrity.
Integrity is constitutive of good character.
One cannot consistently act as a person of good character without having it.
To act ethically is to act as a person of good character does.
Ethics specifies what one has most reason to do or want.
So, if you ask me what I have most reason to do in a circumstance where I’ve made a commitment, ceteris paribus, I’ll respond that I’ll make good on my commitments.