Early in any scientific enterprise, it is best to forge ahead and not get bogged down by semantic distinctions. But “forging ahead” is a concept alien to philosophers, even those as distinguished as McGinn. To a philosopher who demanded that he define consciousness before studying it scientifically, Francis Crick once responded, “My dear chap, there was never a time in the early years of molecular biology when we sat around the table with a bunch of philosophers saying ‘let us define life first.’ We just went out there and found out what it was: a double helix.” In the sciences, definitions often follow, rather than precede, conceptual advances.
Scientist vs. philosopher on conceptual analysis
In Less Wrong Rationality and Mainstream Philosophy, Conceptual Analysis and Moral Theory, and Pluralistic Moral Reductionism, I suggested that traditional philosophical conceptual analysis often fails to be valuable. Neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran has recently made some of the points in a polite sparring with philosopher Colin McGinn over Ramachandran’s new book The Tell-Tale Brain: