You do, however, seem to be making the claim that given the current uncertainties, one should not sign up for cryonics; and this is the point on which we seem to really disagree.
One’s actions are a statement of probability, or they should be if one is thinking and acting somewhat rationally under a state of uncertainty.
It’s not known with certainty whether the current cryonics procedure will suffice to actually extend my life, but that doesn’t excuse me from making a decision about it now since I might well die before the feasibility of cryonics is definitively settled, and since I legitimately care about things like “dying needlessly” on the one hand and “wasting money pointlessly” on the other.
You might legitimately come to the conclusion that you don’t like the odds when compared with the present cost and with respect to your priorities in life. But saying “I’m not sure of the chances, therefore I’ll go with the less weird-sounding choice, or the one that doesn’t require any present effort on my part” is an unsound heuristic in general.
But saying “I’m not sure of the chances, therefore I’ll go with the less weird-sounding choice, or the one that doesn’t require any present effort on my part” is an unsound heuristic in general.
But saying “I’m not sure of the chances, therefore I’ll go with the less weird-sounding choice, or the one that doesn’t require any present effort on my part” is an unsound heuristic in general.
I might be missing a bit of jargon here, but what would it mean for a heuristic to be “unsound”? Do you mean it performs badly against other competing heuristics?
It sounds to me like a heuristic that should work pretty well, and I’m not sure of any heuristic that is as simple but works better for general cases. It seems to be the same caliber as “gambling money is bad”.
You do, however, seem to be making the claim that given the current uncertainties, one should not sign up for cryonics; and this is the point on which we seem to really disagree.
One’s actions are a statement of probability, or they should be if one is thinking and acting somewhat rationally under a state of uncertainty.
It’s not known with certainty whether the current cryonics procedure will suffice to actually extend my life, but that doesn’t excuse me from making a decision about it now since I might well die before the feasibility of cryonics is definitively settled, and since I legitimately care about things like “dying needlessly” on the one hand and “wasting money pointlessly” on the other.
You might legitimately come to the conclusion that you don’t like the odds when compared with the present cost and with respect to your priorities in life. But saying “I’m not sure of the chances, therefore I’ll go with the less weird-sounding choice, or the one that doesn’t require any present effort on my part” is an unsound heuristic in general.
A good point.
I might be missing a bit of jargon here, but what would it mean for a heuristic to be “unsound”? Do you mean it performs badly against other competing heuristics?
It sounds to me like a heuristic that should work pretty well, and I’m not sure of any heuristic that is as simple but works better for general cases. It seems to be the same caliber as “gambling money is bad”.