I don’t like chapters 8 and 9, in which Eliezer seems to be writing as though he thinks that the reader is an idiot who needs to be begged to give a new idea a chance. As far as I can tell, decision theory is supposed to be math, and mathematicians are supposed to be more agreeable to that sort of thing—there’s nothing wrong with defining a “new” system and exploring its consequences, even if that system seems “absurd”. (For example, paraconsistent logics.)
I finally started reading this paper.
I don’t like chapters 8 and 9, in which Eliezer seems to be writing as though he thinks that the reader is an idiot who needs to be begged to give a new idea a chance. As far as I can tell, decision theory is supposed to be math, and mathematicians are supposed to be more agreeable to that sort of thing—there’s nothing wrong with defining a “new” system and exploring its consequences, even if that system seems “absurd”. (For example, paraconsistent logics.)