Hanlon has claimed 6% before, based on a Fermi estimate that may or may not mean anything.
The difference between this and Pascal’s Wager is that there’s no tradeoff between small probability scenarios; there’s either assured death or almost-assured-death. The argument is roughly (small probability)*(high utility) > (lost utility of cheap investment).
(But of course see gwern’s remarks on the cheapness of the investment.)
Hanlon has claimed 6% before, based on a Fermi estimate that may or may not mean anything.
The difference between this and Pascal’s Wager is that there’s no tradeoff between small probability scenarios; there’s either assured death or almost-assured-death. The argument is roughly (small probability)*(high utility) > (lost utility of cheap investment).
(But of course see gwern’s remarks on the cheapness of the investment.)
You can rephrase it as a small probability of revival vs a small probability of REALLY needing that money.