I am strongly reminded of the descriptions of the “upper class” in ACX’s review of Fussel: “[T]he upper class doesn’t worry about status because that would imply they have something to prove, which they don’t.”, and therefore they are extremely meticulous in making sure that nothing they do looks like signalling, ever, because otherwise people might think they have something to prove (which they don’t). Boring parties, specifically non-ostentatious mansions, food which is just bland enough to avoid being too good and look like they’re trying to show something, etc.
This kind of thing does happen. A group thinks they can be above signalling, and starts avoiding any attempts to signal, and then everyone notices that visible attempts to signal are bad signalling. Good signalling is looking like you’re not trying to signal. And then the game starts all over again, only with yet another level of convoluted rules.
That’s a really good point. It’s like stealth obsession with signaling, because there’s a need to not signal.
This in turn reminds me of how beginning statistics students often confuse independence and anti-correlation. I’m trying to point at the analog of independence, but if folk who feel compelled that I’m pointing at something real don’t grok what I’m pointing at, they’re likely to land on the analog of anti-correlation.
I am strongly reminded of the descriptions of the “upper class” in ACX’s review of Fussel: “[T]he upper class doesn’t worry about status because that would imply they have something to prove, which they don’t.”, and therefore they are extremely meticulous in making sure that nothing they do looks like signalling, ever, because otherwise people might think they have something to prove (which they don’t). Boring parties, specifically non-ostentatious mansions, food which is just bland enough to avoid being too good and look like they’re trying to show something, etc.
This kind of thing does happen. A group thinks they can be above signalling, and starts avoiding any attempts to signal, and then everyone notices that visible attempts to signal are bad signalling. Good signalling is looking like you’re not trying to signal. And then the game starts all over again, only with yet another level of convoluted rules.
That’s a really good point. It’s like stealth obsession with signaling, because there’s a need to not signal.
This in turn reminds me of how beginning statistics students often confuse independence and anti-correlation. I’m trying to point at the analog of independence, but if folk who feel compelled that I’m pointing at something real don’t grok what I’m pointing at, they’re likely to land on the analog of anti-correlation.