If the simulation isn’t run all the way through, the simulators couldn’t be sure they were resurrecting you instead of someone else (since the mind they were simulating might suddenly have started to do other things that you wouldn’t have done, if they had continued to the simulation.) For example, suppose they base the simulation in part on your Less Wrong comments. If they manage to produce a mind that produces the first half of your comments, then they say, “good enough, let’s move that to heaven,” it might be that the mind they put in heaven would have gone on to produce a second set of comments totally diverse from the real ones that you made. So it ended up being someone else in heaven, not you.
I, a year ago, was a slightly different person than I am now. Both past-me and current-me are me. You are essentially saying that me-who-died is the version that should go to heaven and all the previous versions should not. Why?
We can also reverse the issue—in a simulation, I don’t have to die. If I am hit by a bus, insert a one-minute delay somewhere and the simulated-I will continue to live. Should that longer-lived version go to heaven, then?
Historical consistency—an intervention like that quickly leads to a fictional world that is ranked low in the ress utility function (because people from that fictional world don’t go on to create the actual future resurrection).
In part but there are also can be regular causal trades between simulators within each world. For example a future simulation physically located in say china will necessarily be separate from located in canada. These simulators can trade in the more regular sense.
If the simulation isn’t run all the way through, the simulators couldn’t be sure they were resurrecting you instead of someone else (since the mind they were simulating might suddenly have started to do other things that you wouldn’t have done, if they had continued to the simulation.) For example, suppose they base the simulation in part on your Less Wrong comments. If they manage to produce a mind that produces the first half of your comments, then they say, “good enough, let’s move that to heaven,” it might be that the mind they put in heaven would have gone on to produce a second set of comments totally diverse from the real ones that you made. So it ended up being someone else in heaven, not you.
That goes to the issue of who is “you”.
I, a year ago, was a slightly different person than I am now. Both past-me and current-me are me. You are essentially saying that me-who-died is the version that should go to heaven and all the previous versions should not. Why?
We can also reverse the issue—in a simulation, I don’t have to die. If I am hit by a bus, insert a one-minute delay somewhere and the simulated-I will continue to live. Should that longer-lived version go to heaven, then?
Historical consistency—an intervention like that quickly leads to a fictional world that is ranked low in the ress utility function (because people from that fictional world don’t go on to create the actual future resurrection).
So is this whole “res utility function” based on obligations arising out of acausal trades?
In part but there are also can be regular causal trades between simulators within each world. For example a future simulation physically located in say china will necessarily be separate from located in canada. These simulators can trade in the more regular sense.