This double-negative “if you really believe not-X then you’re wrong” framing is a bit confusing, so I’ll just ask.
Consider the set P of all processes that take a person X1 as input and produce X2 as output, where there’s no known test that can distinguish X1 from X2. Consider three such processes: P1 - A digital upload of X1 is created. P2 - X1 is cryogenically suspended and subsequently restored. P3 - X1 lives for a decade of normal life.
Call F(P) the probability that X2 is in any sense that matters not the same person as X1, or perhaps not a person at all.
Do you think F(P1) is more than epsilon different from F(P2)? Than F(P3)? Do you think F(P2) is more than epsilon different from F(P3)?
For my part, I consider all three within epsilon of one another, given the premises.
Do you think F(P1) is more than epsilon different from F(P2)? Than F(P3)?
Do you think F(P2) is more than epsilon different from F(P3)?
Erm, yes, to all three. The two transitions all involve things which are initially plausible and have not been driven down to epsilon (which is a very small quantity) by subsequent research.
For example, we still don’t have great evidence that brain activity isn’t dynamicly dependent on electrical activity (among others!) which is destroyed by death/cryonics. All we have are a few scatter-shot examples about hypothermia and stuff, which is a level of proof I would barely deign to look at for supplements, much less claim that it’s such great evidence that it drives down the probability of error to epsilon!
This double-negative “if you really believe not-X then you’re wrong” framing is a bit confusing, so I’ll just ask.
Consider the set P of all processes that take a person X1 as input and produce X2 as output, where there’s no known test that can distinguish X1 from X2. Consider three such processes:
P1 - A digital upload of X1 is created.
P2 - X1 is cryogenically suspended and subsequently restored.
P3 - X1 lives for a decade of normal life.
Call F(P) the probability that X2 is in any sense that matters not the same person as X1, or perhaps not a person at all.
Do you think F(P1) is more than epsilon different from F(P2)? Than F(P3)?
Do you think F(P2) is more than epsilon different from F(P3)?
For my part, I consider all three within epsilon of one another, given the premises.
Erm, yes, to all three. The two transitions all involve things which are initially plausible and have not been driven down to epsilon (which is a very small quantity) by subsequent research.
For example, we still don’t have great evidence that brain activity isn’t dynamicly dependent on electrical activity (among others!) which is destroyed by death/cryonics. All we have are a few scatter-shot examples about hypothermia and stuff, which is a level of proof I would barely deign to look at for supplements, much less claim that it’s such great evidence that it drives down the probability of error to epsilon!
OK, thanks for clarifying.