I. J. Good’s original, which I’ve somewhat abridged, explicitly specifies that there are no competitors who cause visible losses/gains after the invention is rejected.
I. J. Good’s original, which I’ve somewhat abridged, explicitly specifies that there are no competitors who cause visible losses/gains after the invention is rejected.
To clarify, this is a summary of what you’ve excluded in your quote, not a response to the other case where the ethical problem exists, correct?
In general, this is referred to as the principal-agent problem.
Note that the adviser’s ethical problem also exists if L/V > p/(1-p) > l/v.
Is the order also inverted in the original?
Fixed.
I. J. Good’s original, which I’ve somewhat abridged, explicitly specifies that there are no competitors who cause visible losses/gains after the invention is rejected.
To clarify, this is a summary of what you’ve excluded in your quote, not a response to the other case where the ethical problem exists, correct?
It’s a summary of what I excluded—I had actually misinterpreted, hence my quote indeed was not a valid reply! The other case is indeed real, sorry.