It seems to me that Dyson’s argument was that as temperature falls, so does the energy required for computing. So, the point in time when we run out of available energy to compute diverges. But, Thomas reasonably points out (I think—correct me if I am misrepresenting you Thomas) that as temperature falls and the energy used for computing falls, so does the speed of computation, and so the amount of computation that can be performed converges, even if we were to compute forever.
Also, isn’t Thomas correct that Planck’s constant puts an absolute minimum on the amount of energy required for computation?
These seem like perfectly reasonable responses to Dyson’s comments. What am I missing?
You understand me correctly in every way. If I am right, that’s another matter. I think I am.
Dyson opens up another interesting question with this. Is it better to survive forever with a finite subjective time T, or it is better to consume 2*T experience in a finite amount of calendar time?
Dyson opens up another interesting question with this. Is it better to survive forever with a finite subjective time T, or it is better to consume 2*T experience in a finite amount of calendar time?
I would guess that most people who want that simply haven’t considered the difference between “how much” and “how long”, and if convinced of the possibility of decoupling subjective and objective time would prefer longer-subjective to longer-objective when given the choice.
(Of course the experiences one may want to have will typically include interacting with other people, so “compressed” experience may be useful only if lots of other people are similarly compressing theirs.)
Well. If one (Omega or someone like him) asked me to choose between 1000 years compressed into the next hour or just 100 years uncompressed inside the real time from now on … I am not sure what to say to him.
Again, the existence of other people complicates this (as it does so many other things). If I’m offered this deal right now and choose to have 1000 years of subjective experience compressed into the next hour and then die, then e.g. I never get to see my daughter grow up, I leave my wife a widow and my child an orphan, I never see any of my friends again, etc. It would be nice to have a thousand years of experiences, but it’s far from clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.
This doesn’t seem to apply in the case of, e.g., a whole civilization choosing whether or not to go digital, and it would apply differently if this sort of decision were commonplace.
blather
Thomas’s comment seems quite sensible to me.
It seems to me that Dyson’s argument was that as temperature falls, so does the energy required for computing. So, the point in time when we run out of available energy to compute diverges. But, Thomas reasonably points out (I think—correct me if I am misrepresenting you Thomas) that as temperature falls and the energy used for computing falls, so does the speed of computation, and so the amount of computation that can be performed converges, even if we were to compute forever.
Also, isn’t Thomas correct that Planck’s constant puts an absolute minimum on the amount of energy required for computation?
These seem like perfectly reasonable responses to Dyson’s comments. What am I missing?
You understand me correctly in every way. If I am right, that’s another matter. I think I am.
Dyson opens up another interesting question with this. Is it better to survive forever with a finite subjective time T, or it is better to consume 2*T experience in a finite amount of calendar time?
Isn’t 2*T obviously better? Maybe I’m missing something here...
We are on the same page here. But a lot of people want to survive as long as possible. Not as much as possible, but as long as possible.
I would guess that most people who want that simply haven’t considered the difference between “how much” and “how long”, and if convinced of the possibility of decoupling subjective and objective time would prefer longer-subjective to longer-objective when given the choice.
(Of course the experiences one may want to have will typically include interacting with other people, so “compressed” experience may be useful only if lots of other people are similarly compressing theirs.)
Well. If one (Omega or someone like him) asked me to choose between 1000 years compressed into the next hour or just 100 years uncompressed inside the real time from now on … I am not sure what to say to him.
Again, the existence of other people complicates this (as it does so many other things). If I’m offered this deal right now and choose to have 1000 years of subjective experience compressed into the next hour and then die, then e.g. I never get to see my daughter grow up, I leave my wife a widow and my child an orphan, I never see any of my friends again, etc. It would be nice to have a thousand years of experiences, but it’s far from clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.
This doesn’t seem to apply in the case of, e.g., a whole civilization choosing whether or not to go digital, and it would apply differently if this sort of decision were commonplace.
you are missing the concept of blather
The definition of “blather” that I find is:
“talk long-windedly without making very much sense”, which does not sound like Thomas’s comment.
What definition are you using?