So fiction was just an example of a more general proposition: enjoyment is bad. Sensual pleasure of any sort is bad. These things are a snare and a delusion.
What are they a distraction from, that should be pursued instead?
There’s a big difference between saying wireheading and superstimulus are bad and saying enjoyment is bad. The way I’m framing it, that’s roughly like the difference between saying that counterfeit money is bad and saying money is bad.
In the view that you’re devils-advocating, fiction is fake, admiring nature is silly, casual sex is meaningless, and music is empty. If these are counterfeits, what are they counterfeits of?
I’d better climb out of the devil’s advocate position before I dig myself too deep a hole.
gjm’s reply is perfect in terms of describing the position being outlined.
I really do want to make a distinction between pleasurable things and terminally-valuable things, though. At least I think I do.
The way you’re reacting makes me think that you don’t—that you find it puzzling that I want to differentiate between superstimulus and actually good things at all, regardless of questions about fiction and such.
I think it would be unfortunate if future civilizations decided maximum wireheading was the greatest ethical good.
I think it would also be unfortunate (but less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted full sensory experiences, akin to movies, were the ultimate good.
I furthermore think it would be unfortunate (but significantly less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted interactive experiences, akin to 1-player games with only non-sentient NPCs, were the ultimate good.
(With significantly more uncertainty, I think it would be much worse if all of the movies or interactive experiences were identical. The image of billions or more identical clones (human-optimal in whatever sense) watching identical recordings of a single extremely well-crafted thousand-year movie does not appeal very much to me. I’m not sure it’s more preferable than a single human experiencing this best-of-all-possible-movies. Similarly, but less so, for interactive experiences.)
The ideal case seems much more like a massively multiplayer one, despite the fact that players will tend to clash with one another and it’s much harder to optimize properly (will have to be worse in other respects as a result).
Applying the intuitions from these rather distant scenarios to more everyday matters, the enjoyment from ice cream does fall rather far toward the beginning of the spectrum I’ve just outlined. It seems rather like a small dose of wireheading (except when enjoyed socially).
(I find it quite amusing that I’m getting push-back on the ice cream thing.)
I really do want to make a distinction between pleasurable things and terminally-valuable things, though. At least I think I do.
I’m missing a description of what those terminally-valuable goals might be, though.
I think it would be unfortunate if future civilizations decided maximum wireheading was the greatest ethical good.
I agree. But the fundamental question: what is the good of Man? is going unanswered. As it mostly has done on LessWrong, even in the Sequences. We spend our whole lives on two things: overcoming problems, and enjoying ourselves. Bread (the struggle to procure it) and circuses. In Paradise, the problems are gone, the bread is free; is anything left but lotus-eating?
I don’t have an answer to that either. One can talk about “eudaimonia”, or “flourishing”, or as Eliezer does, “fun”, but those are just names for whatever it is.
But casting this in terms of Paradise, whether the transhuman one or a religious one, removes the problem from the world around us and too easily leads into empty speculation. When you leave aside the irksome chores of keeping your body fed, clothed, and housed, and the rejected pleasures listed previously, what purposes should get someone out of bed in the morning? And when they are achieved, what then? Is there, in fact, such a thing as a terminal goal?
(I find it quite amusing that I’m getting push-back on the ice cream thing.)
gjm said that it’s “basically sugar and fat, neither of which is very good for your health when consumed in large quantities”. But the dose makes the poison; fat is an essential macronutrient, and carbohydrates all but.
I’m sceptical of the whole superstimulus idea, based partly on personal experience and partly on an understanding of control systems. I hinted at the former in speaking of having had an ice-cream “as recently as a month ago”. People speak of chocolate as another superstimulus. There’s usually a 200g block of Cadbury’s Fruit and Nut in my store cupboard. A block lasts about a month and is only there for quasi-medicinal purposes, to alleviate low blood sugar crashes (of causes unknown). From the point of view of control systems, if your satiety-sensing system is in order, you will never overeat. The “attractiveness” of food is irrelevant. I don’t care how “enjoyable” something is to eat, if I’m already full it is effortless to decline to eat more, and repugnant to do otherwise. Whatever is going wrong in the current surge of obesity, it isn’t extraordinarily attractive food.
Whatever is going wrong in the current surge of obesity, it isn’t extraordinarily attractive food.
Yeah, that’s true.
I agree. But the fundamental question: what is the good of Man? is going unanswered.
In terms of it going unanswered in the Sequences or wider lesswrong, I somewhat disagree. The sequences specifically argue that good is complex and fragile—complex meaning it would take a long time to write down all the details and they can’t just be summarized with a pattern that gives rise to them; fragile meaning that we need to get all the details right. This means, specifically, that Eliezer did not expect anyone to be able to write everything humans value down and get it right in one shot, even given considerable effort. Instead, some aspects were addressed which were particularly important to illustrate one point or another.
As for me, I also was not expecting to be able to fully articulate what it is that I, or humans, value. I’m trying to articulate my intuitions about this particular issue.
I’m missing a description of what those terminally-valuable goals might be, though.
I think the reason that you’re asking is because you think I’m pushing everything off the table, in trying to make a distinction between pleasurable things and actually-valuable things. At times in this conversation, under varying degrees of devil’s-advocacy, I’ve pushed things ranging from fiction to taking a walk in the park off the table. I can see why you’re concerned.
My intuition tends to say that nothing is very valuable in isolation. Things gain meaning by their connection to each other (beyond just instrumental value of being able to physically cause more value down the line). This is because value comes from patterns of things, and systems of interconnected structure. A thing like an ice cream cone is not totally devoid of this kind of beauty; it’s a matter of degree.
Fiction is counterfeit learning or counterfeit human relationships. Admiring nature is a side-effect of preferences that evolved to help us find good places to live or stay. Casual sex is a counterfeit of not-so-casual sex, which helps to make families (in at least two ways). Music is counterfeit pattern-spotting. Ice cream is basically sugar and fat, neither of which is very good for your health when consumed in large quantities.
Something along those lines, anyway.
(Full disclosure: I read fiction, admire nature, have not-so-casual sex because I’m married, spend an appreciable fraction of my life on music, and make my own ice cream.)
Admiring nature is a side-effect of preferences that evolved to help us find good places to live or stay.
That’s a fine just-so story, but if this (13 minute video of nature’s beauty, in the form of uninhabited and mostly uninhabitable places) isn’t a counterexample, it’s not clear what could be.
They’re all just-so stories. Any of them might turn out to be wrong.
(But I don’t think there’s any contradiction between “some very beautiful places are utterly uninhabitable” and “the tastes that make us find some places more beautiful than others evolved to help us find good places to live”. There can be natural as well as artificial superstimuli.)
That looks to me like a very uncharitable reading of (or extrapolation from) what abramdemski has said. I take it to be, rather: enjoyment is (to abramdemski, at least) less valuable than we are apt to think it and enjoyment of things that harm us is a snare and a delusion; the existence of superstimuli (and especially the fact that superstimuli can be engineered by others who don’t necessarily have our best interests in view) makes it more dangerous.
The ice cream example aside, I think it would be wrong to say fiction is something that harms us even as we enjoy it, except in the sense of opportunity costs, which is what abramdemski seems to be arguing. Fiction can use superstimuli to manipulate people, but so can lots of other things.
There’s nothing especially wrong with ice cream, that I know of. But abramdemsky disagrees:
Eating ice cream is bad as a matter of fact (this doesn’t seem to require much argument). It’s just a superstimulus for “good food”, and furthermore, negatively impacts health.
So fiction was just an example of a more general proposition: enjoyment is bad. Sensual pleasure of any sort is bad. These things are a snare and a delusion.
What are they a distraction from, that should be pursued instead?
There’s a big difference between saying wireheading and superstimulus are bad and saying enjoyment is bad. The way I’m framing it, that’s roughly like the difference between saying that counterfeit money is bad and saying money is bad.
In the view that you’re devils-advocating, fiction is fake, admiring nature is silly, casual sex is meaningless, and music is empty. If these are counterfeits, what are they counterfeits of?
And what’s the thing about ice-cream?
I’d better climb out of the devil’s advocate position before I dig myself too deep a hole.
gjm’s reply is perfect in terms of describing the position being outlined.
I really do want to make a distinction between pleasurable things and terminally-valuable things, though. At least I think I do.
The way you’re reacting makes me think that you don’t—that you find it puzzling that I want to differentiate between superstimulus and actually good things at all, regardless of questions about fiction and such.
I think it would be unfortunate if future civilizations decided maximum wireheading was the greatest ethical good.
I think it would also be unfortunate (but less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted full sensory experiences, akin to movies, were the ultimate good.
I furthermore think it would be unfortunate (but significantly less so) if future civilizations decided that finely crafted interactive experiences, akin to 1-player games with only non-sentient NPCs, were the ultimate good.
(With significantly more uncertainty, I think it would be much worse if all of the movies or interactive experiences were identical. The image of billions or more identical clones (human-optimal in whatever sense) watching identical recordings of a single extremely well-crafted thousand-year movie does not appeal very much to me. I’m not sure it’s more preferable than a single human experiencing this best-of-all-possible-movies. Similarly, but less so, for interactive experiences.)
The ideal case seems much more like a massively multiplayer one, despite the fact that players will tend to clash with one another and it’s much harder to optimize properly (will have to be worse in other respects as a result).
Applying the intuitions from these rather distant scenarios to more everyday matters, the enjoyment from ice cream does fall rather far toward the beginning of the spectrum I’ve just outlined. It seems rather like a small dose of wireheading (except when enjoyed socially).
(I find it quite amusing that I’m getting push-back on the ice cream thing.)
I’m missing a description of what those terminally-valuable goals might be, though.
I agree. But the fundamental question: what is the good of Man? is going unanswered. As it mostly has done on LessWrong, even in the Sequences. We spend our whole lives on two things: overcoming problems, and enjoying ourselves. Bread (the struggle to procure it) and circuses. In Paradise, the problems are gone, the bread is free; is anything left but lotus-eating?
I don’t have an answer to that either. One can talk about “eudaimonia”, or “flourishing”, or as Eliezer does, “fun”, but those are just names for whatever it is.
But casting this in terms of Paradise, whether the transhuman one or a religious one, removes the problem from the world around us and too easily leads into empty speculation. When you leave aside the irksome chores of keeping your body fed, clothed, and housed, and the rejected pleasures listed previously, what purposes should get someone out of bed in the morning? And when they are achieved, what then? Is there, in fact, such a thing as a terminal goal?
gjm said that it’s “basically sugar and fat, neither of which is very good for your health when consumed in large quantities”. But the dose makes the poison; fat is an essential macronutrient, and carbohydrates all but.
I’m sceptical of the whole superstimulus idea, based partly on personal experience and partly on an understanding of control systems. I hinted at the former in speaking of having had an ice-cream “as recently as a month ago”. People speak of chocolate as another superstimulus. There’s usually a 200g block of Cadbury’s Fruit and Nut in my store cupboard. A block lasts about a month and is only there for quasi-medicinal purposes, to alleviate low blood sugar crashes (of causes unknown). From the point of view of control systems, if your satiety-sensing system is in order, you will never overeat. The “attractiveness” of food is irrelevant. I don’t care how “enjoyable” something is to eat, if I’m already full it is effortless to decline to eat more, and repugnant to do otherwise. Whatever is going wrong in the current surge of obesity, it isn’t extraordinarily attractive food.
Yeah, that’s true.
In terms of it going unanswered in the Sequences or wider lesswrong, I somewhat disagree. The sequences specifically argue that good is complex and fragile—complex meaning it would take a long time to write down all the details and they can’t just be summarized with a pattern that gives rise to them; fragile meaning that we need to get all the details right. This means, specifically, that Eliezer did not expect anyone to be able to write everything humans value down and get it right in one shot, even given considerable effort. Instead, some aspects were addressed which were particularly important to illustrate one point or another.
As for me, I also was not expecting to be able to fully articulate what it is that I, or humans, value. I’m trying to articulate my intuitions about this particular issue.
I think the reason that you’re asking is because you think I’m pushing everything off the table, in trying to make a distinction between pleasurable things and actually-valuable things. At times in this conversation, under varying degrees of devil’s-advocacy, I’ve pushed things ranging from fiction to taking a walk in the park off the table. I can see why you’re concerned.
My intuition tends to say that nothing is very valuable in isolation. Things gain meaning by their connection to each other (beyond just instrumental value of being able to physically cause more value down the line). This is because value comes from patterns of things, and systems of interconnected structure. A thing like an ice cream cone is not totally devoid of this kind of beauty; it’s a matter of degree.
Fiction is counterfeit learning or counterfeit human relationships. Admiring nature is a side-effect of preferences that evolved to help us find good places to live or stay. Casual sex is a counterfeit of not-so-casual sex, which helps to make families (in at least two ways). Music is counterfeit pattern-spotting. Ice cream is basically sugar and fat, neither of which is very good for your health when consumed in large quantities.
Something along those lines, anyway.
(Full disclosure: I read fiction, admire nature, have not-so-casual sex because I’m married, spend an appreciable fraction of my life on music, and make my own ice cream.)
That’s a fine just-so story, but if this (13 minute video of nature’s beauty, in the form of uninhabited and mostly uninhabitable places) isn’t a counterexample, it’s not clear what could be.
They’re all just-so stories. Any of them might turn out to be wrong.
(But I don’t think there’s any contradiction between “some very beautiful places are utterly uninhabitable” and “the tastes that make us find some places more beautiful than others evolved to help us find good places to live”. There can be natural as well as artificial superstimuli.)
That looks to me like a very uncharitable reading of (or extrapolation from) what abramdemski has said. I take it to be, rather: enjoyment is (to abramdemski, at least) less valuable than we are apt to think it and enjoyment of things that harm us is a snare and a delusion; the existence of superstimuli (and especially the fact that superstimuli can be engineered by others who don’t necessarily have our best interests in view) makes it more dangerous.
The ice cream example aside, I think it would be wrong to say fiction is something that harms us even as we enjoy it, except in the sense of opportunity costs, which is what abramdemski seems to be arguing. Fiction can use superstimuli to manipulate people, but so can lots of other things.
What is it about ice-cream? I had one as recently as a month ago, and, well, what?
There’s nothing especially wrong with ice cream, that I know of. But abramdemsky disagrees: