So your idea is to have them stay in there indefinitely as someone might get hurt on the way out?
That’s not at all what I said.
If you can’t evacuate a theatre without a reasonable expectation that no-one will be harmed you shouldn’t be running a theatre and anyone who is harmed should sue you (or fire marshals, local council, regulators or whoever should shut you down).
Basically what TheOtherDave (hmm, convenient, as I happen to be a Dave as well...) said. A bunch of frightened people moving about all at once are going to present more risk than a bunch of calm people trickling in and out; the question is what we can do to lower that risk. Any security measure is about tradeoffs, and when it costs X to lower the risk by Y of harm Z, and X > Y Z chance of an incident, then implementing the measure is bad policy. This calculus is embodied in the decisions made by the fire marshals and the local councils and regulators and whatnot as they put together the local fire code, run inspections, etc, whose goal is not to reduce the risk to zero (or even “absolutely as low as we can go at any cost”).
when it costs X to lower the risk by Y of harm Z, and X > Y Z chance of an incident, then implementing the measure is bad policy.
Is exactly the point, but you have not defined X. Given that X leads to a slippery slope decrease in all free speech rights (e.g. Gitmo torture reporting, Bradley Manning etc. etc.) then how do you quantify X?
Sometimes the direct harm of X may be less than the others, but the principle is much more important.
This is why we presume people innocent. This is why convicting no-one is preferable to convicting the wrong person. This is why, in short, we have rights!
Which has nothing to say on the possible, actual or long-term harm of removing the rights of free speech in a certain situation—it simply defines (quite well) the other side of the equation.
The criminalisation of free speech is a severe measure and must be as limited as is practicable in scope. All western societies are based on the free exchange and discussions of ideas. The benefit of free speech is so great (as mentioned in the Hustler case) that its restriction must prevent some great harm. As a recent example showed, the right of a Florida pastor to burn a book outweighed the strong probability of his actions leading to a severe cost of injury (death) to US, and other, civilians and military abroad.
Now, maybe you think his rights should have been quashed (I strongly don’t), in which case you’re consistent, or you must think that the right to yell “fire!” when there isn’t one should be upheld as the probability of harm, and the likely amount of harm, are low—or you’re applying different rules according to some outside notion not yet mentioned.
I happen to think there is another notion here—intent. The intent of the “fire!” yeller is somewhat irrelevant since the actual danger is, or should be, minimal. The pastor simply wanted to upset Muslims, which is certainly protected under free speech, their reaction is a separate problem. Whereas a mafia don publicly offering a bounty on someone’s head is a different ballgame.
I happen to think there is another notion here—intent. The intent of the “fire!” yeller is somewhat irrelevant since the actual danger is, or should be, minimal.
The is a core part of the disagreement. The cost of preventing risk of injury from a false yell of fire is prohibitive for the owner of the theater. So it is reasonable to shift some of the cost of prevention to the person who knows there is no fire but wants to yell fire, in part because the cost of not falsely yelling fire is so low. Further, it is reasonable to expect the potential false-yeller to know that the yell will be believed, cause panic and therefore cause injury.
The Koran burner receives more protection because there wasn’t a knowing falsehood in that case. The relevant mental state is not intent to harm, but knowledge of the statement’s falsity.
Okay, but what it comes down to is what is the expected reaction of reasonable people in a given situation. If people can’t safely exit a theatre then we need to re-think theatres. And safety tests.
If I’m in a theatre and a patron shouts that the popcorn has been poisoned (an intentional lie) then I can’t conceive of any action (assuming [s]he hasn’t been near the popcorn) other than ejection and ban. don’t see why their liberty has to be sacrificed.
Similarly, if the risk of injury is as low as I think it (should be) is then the intent to cause panic is again not an issue for the criminal justice system. Sue them (if you can/must) and ban them for life.
The apparent agreement that a false statement that has an incredibly small chance of causing actual harm, where the harm is unlikely unless the venue is sub-par, should go beyond the basic remedies for the discomfort and damages caused by the injured parties and spill over into denying someone their liberty is worrisome.
Well, we don’t agree that a venue where people would get injured in a panic is sub-par. We’ve learned a lot since the 1910s, but panics are like hundred year floods in that it does not make economic sense to constantly prepare for every possible event of that level of unlikeliness.
But I agree that speech that is intended to cause harm but is unlikely to be able to cause harm (i.e. an obviously false claim that the popcorn is poisoned) is not a good candidate for criminal penalty. But it’s generally quite hard to prove that one intended harm if one’s acts seem unlikely to be able to cause harm.
I find it’s easier to think clearly about this stuff if, when calculating the costs on both sides, I try to forget that I have a preferred answer.
The cost of someone shouting “fire!” in a theatre is what it is; I’m inclined to agree with you that it’s not very high, though I think you’re trying to make it sound lower than it is. The cost of preventing someone from shouting “fire!” in a theatre is what it is as well. Looking at just the first-order costs I conclude that the costs of preventing it are in general lower than the costs of it happening.
The second-order costs are less clear to me and can easily swamp the first-order costs, though. Mostly it becomes a question of whether there’s a reliable Schelling point near shouting “fire!” that I expect to prevent that from becoming grounds for supporting higher-cost speech suppression. I’m less certain about that; and I expect it depends a lot on the specific community, so I can easily see where the “shouting fire” legal principle leads to a lot of expensive bad law, and that on balance we’d therefore do better discarding the principle.
Or perhaps not. If I were actually interested in activism on this issue, I would start by refining my estimates.
As for intent, I’d say it’s at least theoretically relevant. For example, I consider the cost of having prevented all-and-only people who wish to shout “fire!” in a theatre for malicious reasons from doing so to be significantly lower than the costs of having prevented everyone from doing so regardless of their intent. That said, the costs of implementing such a policy given current technology are onerous, so I probably oppose (given current technology) having such a law, although various cheap approximations of it might be OK.
When the phrase was coined, they were almost certainly referring to the then-recent Italian Hall Disaster, in which 73 people were killed as a direct result of someone falsely shouting “fire”.
If you think that can’t happen now, substitute in your imagination some other utterance that kills 73 people in short order. Like maybe, going to a police hostage standoff and mimicking the sound of a gunshot.
As I stated elsewhere, the point of the quote is that there are limits somewhere on freedom of speech. Where to draw the line is hard, and the current First Amendment doctrine is different and more speech tolerant than Schenk.
Noting that on the one hand I don’t think our actual policy recommendations would be far apart (as pertaining to the issues at hand, at least) , and on the other that I have may objections to particulars your post above, I am going to nonetheless bow out as we are straying much too deep into mind-killer territory for my liking. I notice that you are new here, and point you toward Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided and Politics Is The Mind-Killer, if you have not already seen them. Feel free to contact me privately if you would like to continue any political part of this discussion in another forum.
That’s not at all what I said.
Basically what TheOtherDave (hmm, convenient, as I happen to be a Dave as well...) said. A bunch of frightened people moving about all at once are going to present more risk than a bunch of calm people trickling in and out; the question is what we can do to lower that risk. Any security measure is about tradeoffs, and when it costs X to lower the risk by Y of harm Z, and X > Y Z chance of an incident, then implementing the measure is bad policy. This calculus is embodied in the decisions made by the fire marshals and the local councils and regulators and whatnot as they put together the local fire code, run inspections, etc, whose goal is not to reduce the risk to zero (or even “absolutely as low as we can go at any cost”).
So close notTheOtherDave...
Is exactly the point, but you have not defined X. Given that X leads to a slippery slope decrease in all free speech rights (e.g. Gitmo torture reporting, Bradley Manning etc. etc.) then how do you quantify X?
Sometimes the direct harm of X may be less than the others, but the principle is much more important.
This is why we presume people innocent. This is why convicting no-one is preferable to convicting the wrong person. This is why, in short, we have rights!
He did define X. It is the cost of preventing the harm. See generally Burden vs. Cost of Injury x Probability of occurrence
Which has nothing to say on the possible, actual or long-term harm of removing the rights of free speech in a certain situation—it simply defines (quite well) the other side of the equation.
The criminalisation of free speech is a severe measure and must be as limited as is practicable in scope. All western societies are based on the free exchange and discussions of ideas. The benefit of free speech is so great (as mentioned in the Hustler case) that its restriction must prevent some great harm. As a recent example showed, the right of a Florida pastor to burn a book outweighed the strong probability of his actions leading to a severe cost of injury (death) to US, and other, civilians and military abroad.
Now, maybe you think his rights should have been quashed (I strongly don’t), in which case you’re consistent, or you must think that the right to yell “fire!” when there isn’t one should be upheld as the probability of harm, and the likely amount of harm, are low—or you’re applying different rules according to some outside notion not yet mentioned.
I happen to think there is another notion here—intent. The intent of the “fire!” yeller is somewhat irrelevant since the actual danger is, or should be, minimal. The pastor simply wanted to upset Muslims, which is certainly protected under free speech, their reaction is a separate problem. Whereas a mafia don publicly offering a bounty on someone’s head is a different ballgame.
The is a core part of the disagreement. The cost of preventing risk of injury from a false yell of fire is prohibitive for the owner of the theater. So it is reasonable to shift some of the cost of prevention to the person who knows there is no fire but wants to yell fire, in part because the cost of not falsely yelling fire is so low. Further, it is reasonable to expect the potential false-yeller to know that the yell will be believed, cause panic and therefore cause injury.
The Koran burner receives more protection because there wasn’t a knowing falsehood in that case. The relevant mental state is not intent to harm, but knowledge of the statement’s falsity.
Okay, but what it comes down to is what is the expected reaction of reasonable people in a given situation. If people can’t safely exit a theatre then we need to re-think theatres. And safety tests.
If I’m in a theatre and a patron shouts that the popcorn has been poisoned (an intentional lie) then I can’t conceive of any action (assuming [s]he hasn’t been near the popcorn) other than ejection and ban. don’t see why their liberty has to be sacrificed.
Similarly, if the risk of injury is as low as I think it (should be) is then the intent to cause panic is again not an issue for the criminal justice system. Sue them (if you can/must) and ban them for life.
The apparent agreement that a false statement that has an incredibly small chance of causing actual harm, where the harm is unlikely unless the venue is sub-par, should go beyond the basic remedies for the discomfort and damages caused by the injured parties and spill over into denying someone their liberty is worrisome.
Well, we don’t agree that a venue where people would get injured in a panic is sub-par. We’ve learned a lot since the 1910s, but panics are like hundred year floods in that it does not make economic sense to constantly prepare for every possible event of that level of unlikeliness.
But I agree that speech that is intended to cause harm but is unlikely to be able to cause harm (i.e. an obviously false claim that the popcorn is poisoned) is not a good candidate for criminal penalty. But it’s generally quite hard to prove that one intended harm if one’s acts seem unlikely to be able to cause harm.
I find it’s easier to think clearly about this stuff if, when calculating the costs on both sides, I try to forget that I have a preferred answer.
The cost of someone shouting “fire!” in a theatre is what it is; I’m inclined to agree with you that it’s not very high, though I think you’re trying to make it sound lower than it is. The cost of preventing someone from shouting “fire!” in a theatre is what it is as well. Looking at just the first-order costs I conclude that the costs of preventing it are in general lower than the costs of it happening.
The second-order costs are less clear to me and can easily swamp the first-order costs, though. Mostly it becomes a question of whether there’s a reliable Schelling point near shouting “fire!” that I expect to prevent that from becoming grounds for supporting higher-cost speech suppression. I’m less certain about that; and I expect it depends a lot on the specific community, so I can easily see where the “shouting fire” legal principle leads to a lot of expensive bad law, and that on balance we’d therefore do better discarding the principle.
Or perhaps not.
If I were actually interested in activism on this issue, I would start by refining my estimates.
As for intent, I’d say it’s at least theoretically relevant. For example, I consider the cost of having prevented all-and-only people who wish to shout “fire!” in a theatre for malicious reasons from doing so to be significantly lower than the costs of having prevented everyone from doing so regardless of their intent. That said, the costs of implementing such a policy given current technology are onerous, so I probably oppose (given current technology) having such a law, although various cheap approximations of it might be OK.
The cost of a false shout IS low, otherwise we wouldn’t have fire drills.
The second order costs of (the state) limiting free speech when there is no direct harm is huge.
When the phrase was coined, they were almost certainly referring to the then-recent Italian Hall Disaster, in which 73 people were killed as a direct result of someone falsely shouting “fire”.
If you think that can’t happen now, substitute in your imagination some other utterance that kills 73 people in short order. Like maybe, going to a police hostage standoff and mimicking the sound of a gunshot.
As I stated elsewhere, the point of the quote is that there are limits somewhere on freedom of speech. Where to draw the line is hard, and the current First Amendment doctrine is different and more speech tolerant than Schenk.
Noting that on the one hand I don’t think our actual policy recommendations would be far apart (as pertaining to the issues at hand, at least) , and on the other that I have may objections to particulars your post above, I am going to nonetheless bow out as we are straying much too deep into mind-killer territory for my liking. I notice that you are new here, and point you toward Policy Debates Should Not Appear One-Sided and Politics Is The Mind-Killer, if you have not already seen them. Feel free to contact me privately if you would like to continue any political part of this discussion in another forum.