For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.
The phrasing might be better in a different direction:
″...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it’s high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life.”
(in that right-wing conservatives state that high taxes inherently will cause reduction of standard of living/happiness)
″...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it’s high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life.”
There is another conservative argument against this: To acknowledge that it might actually be true that the average happiness is increased, but to reject the morality of it.
Too see why someone might think that, imagine the following scenario: You find scientific evidence for the fact that if one forces the minority of the best-looking young women of a society at gunpoint to be of sexual service to whomever wishes to be pleased (there will be a government office regulating this) increases the average happiness of the country.
In other words, my argument questions that the happiness (needs/wishes/etc.) of a majority is at all relevant. This position is also known as individualism and at the root of (American) conservatism.
Too see why someone might think that, imagine the following scenario: You find scientific evidence for the fact that if one forces the minority of the best-looking young women of a society at gunpoint to be of sexual service to whomever wishes to be pleased (there will be a government office regulating this) increases the average happiness of the country.
If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway
In other words, my argument questions that the happiness (needs/wishes/etc.) of a majority is at all relevant. This position is also known as individualism and at the root of (American) conservatism.
This can be looked at as a form of deontology: govts don’t have the right to tax anybody, and the outcomes of wisely spent taxation don’t affect that.
If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway
No, it suffices if less women’s happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the “amount of happiness”—whatever that is to mean in the first place—is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That’s the whole point of the argument.
I don’t understand what you were saying in the second sentence.
Although I accept this argument in the abstract, I oppose anyone actually trying to propose a policy like this in the real world because, historically, men have overvalued their feelings/utilons as compared to women’s feelings/utilons. It’s a simple ingroup bias, but similar biases in “amount of happiness”-evaluation have historically resulted in the stable maintenance of large pockets of unhappiness in societies (see also: slavery).
historically, men have overvalued their feelings/utilons as compared to women’s feelings/utilons.
I can’t see why this kind of behavior would be adaptive, and experimentsdon’t seem to bear this hypothesis out. It seems that (as should be expected) men favor women. Also, in-group bias is much weaker in men in general.
I’m not sure why women would have evolved to favor women too though.
I can’t see why this kind of behavior would be adaptive, and experiments don’t seem to bear this hypothesis out.
Perhaps I am missing something, but I didn’t see how the study or the wiki article you linked to addressed specifically how men value “their feelings/utilons as compared to women’s feelings/utilons” ? Both the experiment and the article mention prefering mothers over fathers and attributing a higher level of violence to men, neither of which I see as intrinsically linked to what I understood the previous poster to be saying. (I could be not-seeing the link, and/or I could be misinterpreting what point hesperidia was trying to make).
Related, but not entirely the same—I’m also not clear on how the “women are wonderful” effect is in any way correlated with “taking actions and/or advocating policies that benefit women as much as or more than men.” History (and religion) is full of rhetoric that waxes eloquent about the wonderful nature of women, even while there is much debate as to the “sexist” nature of these societies/religions.
It’s also entirely possible that I’m misinterpreting the point you’re trying to make. If that’s so, I’d be interested in clarifying that further.
So, I was especially confused by the claim that “in-group bias is much weaker in men in general.” I knew that in fact, when asked to play a job interviewer or evaluator, men punished women more often than other men for trying to negotiate salary, whereas women punished everyone equally.
But I do see other evidence that calling this “in-group bias” gives the wrong idea. Maybe women tend to have a greater belief in ‘gender roles,’ while disagreeing with men on what those roles require/allow for men specifically. This however seems kind of odd when we see that participants in the first study (both male and female) were less likely to ask for more money from a female evaluator. I guess the women there may have a false picture of men’s motives if they think men will punish them more than another women would (I don’t know the exact numbers). Except, what can the men be thinking if they know that 1. women would treat them the same as everyone would treat women, and 2. the men would treat themselves more leniently than they would treat women?
ETA: actually, it seems unclear from the abstract if men did behave differently with a female evaluator!
No, it suffices if less women’s happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the “amount of happiness”—whatever that is to mean in the first place—is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That’s the whole point of the argument.
^ Upvoted for this.
I don’t understand what you were saying in the second sentence.
If you reject deals with positive expected outcomes because they violate some sort of ethical law, you’re a deontologist. That’s what deontology is.
Is the causation really that clear?
The phrasing might be better in a different direction:
″...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it’s high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life.”
(in that right-wing conservatives state that high taxes inherently will cause reduction of standard of living/happiness)
There is another conservative argument against this: To acknowledge that it might actually be true that the average happiness is increased, but to reject the morality of it.
Too see why someone might think that, imagine the following scenario: You find scientific evidence for the fact that if one forces the minority of the best-looking young women of a society at gunpoint to be of sexual service to whomever wishes to be pleased (there will be a government office regulating this) increases the average happiness of the country.
In other words, my argument questions that the happiness (needs/wishes/etc.) of a majority is at all relevant. This position is also known as individualism and at the root of (American) conservatism.
Even better, we could imagine that torturing Jews to death increases average happiness, because of all the happy racists.
Or removing Freedom would end all wars and poverty
Or [insert sacred value tradeoff here] would result in positive net utility.
IOW, that seems like a mindkilling example.
If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway
This can be looked at as a form of deontology: govts don’t have the right to tax anybody, and the outcomes of wisely spent taxation don’t affect that.
No, it suffices if less women’s happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the “amount of happiness”—whatever that is to mean in the first place—is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That’s the whole point of the argument.
I don’t understand what you were saying in the second sentence.
Although I accept this argument in the abstract, I oppose anyone actually trying to propose a policy like this in the real world because, historically, men have overvalued their feelings/utilons as compared to women’s feelings/utilons. It’s a simple ingroup bias, but similar biases in “amount of happiness”-evaluation have historically resulted in the stable maintenance of large pockets of unhappiness in societies (see also: slavery).
I can’t see why this kind of behavior would be adaptive, and experiments don’t seem to bear this hypothesis out. It seems that (as should be expected) men favor women. Also, in-group bias is much weaker in men in general.
I’m not sure why women would have evolved to favor women too though.
Perhaps I am missing something, but I didn’t see how the study or the wiki article you linked to addressed specifically how men value “their feelings/utilons as compared to women’s feelings/utilons” ? Both the experiment and the article mention prefering mothers over fathers and attributing a higher level of violence to men, neither of which I see as intrinsically linked to what I understood the previous poster to be saying. (I could be not-seeing the link, and/or I could be misinterpreting what point hesperidia was trying to make).
Related, but not entirely the same—I’m also not clear on how the “women are wonderful” effect is in any way correlated with “taking actions and/or advocating policies that benefit women as much as or more than men.” History (and religion) is full of rhetoric that waxes eloquent about the wonderful nature of women, even while there is much debate as to the “sexist” nature of these societies/religions.
It’s also entirely possible that I’m misinterpreting the point you’re trying to make. If that’s so, I’d be interested in clarifying that further.
So, I was especially confused by the claim that “in-group bias is much weaker in men in general.” I knew that in fact, when asked to play a job interviewer or evaluator, men punished women more often than other men for trying to negotiate salary, whereas women punished everyone equally.
But I do see other evidence that calling this “in-group bias” gives the wrong idea. Maybe women tend to have a greater belief in ‘gender roles,’ while disagreeing with men on what those roles require/allow for men specifically. This however seems kind of odd when we see that participants in the first study (both male and female) were less likely to ask for more money from a female evaluator. I guess the women there may have a false picture of men’s motives if they think men will punish them more than another women would (I don’t know the exact numbers). Except, what can the men be thinking if they know that 1. women would treat them the same as everyone would treat women, and 2. the men would treat themselves more leniently than they would treat women?
ETA: actually, it seems unclear from the abstract if men did behave differently with a female evaluator!
^ Upvoted for this.
If you reject deals with positive expected outcomes because they violate some sort of ethical law, you’re a deontologist. That’s what deontology is.