Upvoted for interestingness, but that definition still leaves no room for supernatural beings as far as I’m concerned (assuming I’m interpreting Carrier’s post correctly).
That’s because I don’t draw the distinction between minds and mental things and the ‘nonmental’ that Carrier does—I’ve effectively ruled out the supernatural by fiat because I treat it as axiomatic that the mental is just a kind of physical.
Kinda, though I try to acknowledge that different people mean different things by ‘God.’ For example, some people equate God with love. If you do that God obviously exists.
If God really were love, praying would be a complete waste of time.
Why? The placebo effect and other mindhacks apply to any sort of ritual or ‘magic’. If you accept this, then worshipping ‘love’ or ‘warfare’ or other god-forms is not a waste of time at all—the purpose and effect of prayer need not involve anything supernatural.
That … is a good point, actually. It doesn’t affect my argument—the one I elaborated with my Thom Yorke example—but it does complicate the situation in ways which should be acknowledged.
I tried probing deeper (just out of curiosity) the first few times I was told ‘God is love/an energy/kindness/a force’, but found that my conversant usually had difficulty elaborating beyond the initial statement. There seemed to be some extra, hard to articulate component to what they thought but they were usually unwilling and/or unable to communicate it to me.
After a time I decided to just politely go ‘Hmmmm, I see’ and try changing the subject whenever someone equated God with something mundane in conversation. I think I must have started doing that mentally as well—hence why I take the statement at face value when I hear it.
That matches my experience as well—I think it is a necessarily supernatural description in the Carrier sense of the word, though, if it is to be taken at face value. It’s not like saying “God is Thom Yorke” (to pick the first name that comes to mind—I don’t even know who Thom Yorke is), and then cheerfully conceding that God is not, in fact, omnipotent or omniscient, etc. - the God-is-Love god still has the usual properties, just (or not “just”, depending) also that description.
Well, that might make for more interesting Gospels at least:
My brethren, be not anxious that Thom be absent or that this not come to pass (as in the Book of Kid A, Track 4); for recall as Thom sayeth, “there is nothing to fear, nothing to doubt” (Amnesiac, 2)— verily, in an interstellar burst he shall be back to save the universe (OK Computer, 1). Thou mayst not see him in the world as it is, this gunboat in a sea of fear (The Bends, 2), for Thom doth not belong here (Pablo Honey, 2).
Repent of your sins, lest you go to hell for what your dirty mind is thinking (In Rainbows, 3); steer away from those rocks of evil, or thou shalt be a walking disaster (Hail to the Thief, 9). Therefore immerse your soul in love (The Bends, 12) with all your will, for the best thou can is good enough (Kid A, 6) and Thom shalt see thee in the next life (Kid A, 10).
I suspect the original Gospels were similarly interesting to the early Christians—it’s just that we (most of us, anyway) don’t get the in-jokes any more.
Actually, I favor the “response to the Euthyphro Dilemma” theory—if God is Good, then what God loves must be Good by definition, not by contrivance, and the dilemma collapses.
That is, if you ignore the contrivance that is “God is Good”.
As I understand it, “goodness” is being used in a somewhat confusing way there, referring to not only outcomes in the world and the actions which lead to those outcomes, but also preferences or personality traits which lead to those actions. In other words, there is a set of mental qualities which results in preferable outcomes (good) and a set which does not (evil); God has all of the former qualities and none of the latter, therefore similarity to God can be taken as evidence of goodness and vice-versa.
The main practical difference from Friendly AI is that God is presumed to already exist.
Not according to the Richard Carrier definition of “supernatural”, which I would argue is a more accurate interpretation of the term.
Upvoted for interestingness, but that definition still leaves no room for supernatural beings as far as I’m concerned (assuming I’m interpreting Carrier’s post correctly).
That’s because I don’t draw the distinction between minds and mental things and the ‘nonmental’ that Carrier does—I’ve effectively ruled out the supernatural by fiat because I treat it as axiomatic that the mental is just a kind of physical.
I see—along the lines of theological noncognitivism, then. It’s an unusual position, in my experience.
Kinda, though I try to acknowledge that different people mean different things by ‘God.’ For example, some people equate God with love. If you do that God obviously exists.
If God really were love, praying would be a complete waste of time. I suspect such statements are not actually expressions of factual content.
Why? The placebo effect and other mindhacks apply to any sort of ritual or ‘magic’. If you accept this, then worshipping ‘love’ or ‘warfare’ or other god-forms is not a waste of time at all—the purpose and effect of prayer need not involve anything supernatural.
That … is a good point, actually. It doesn’t affect my argument—the one I elaborated with my Thom Yorke example—but it does complicate the situation in ways which should be acknowledged.
That’s very plausible.
[ETA: It sure is an expeditious way to interpret such statements, though.]
You’re right—best is to inquire for additional details when someone proposes such a statement.
I tried probing deeper (just out of curiosity) the first few times I was told ‘God is love/an energy/kindness/a force’, but found that my conversant usually had difficulty elaborating beyond the initial statement. There seemed to be some extra, hard to articulate component to what they thought but they were usually unwilling and/or unable to communicate it to me.
After a time I decided to just politely go ‘Hmmmm, I see’ and try changing the subject whenever someone equated God with something mundane in conversation. I think I must have started doing that mentally as well—hence why I take the statement at face value when I hear it.
That matches my experience as well—I think it is a necessarily supernatural description in the Carrier sense of the word, though, if it is to be taken at face value. It’s not like saying “God is Thom Yorke” (to pick the first name that comes to mind—I don’t even know who Thom Yorke is), and then cheerfully conceding that God is not, in fact, omnipotent or omniscient, etc. - the God-is-Love god still has the usual properties, just (or not “just”, depending) also that description.
Well, that might make for more interesting Gospels at least:
My brethren, be not anxious that Thom be absent or that this not come to pass (as in the Book of Kid A, Track 4); for recall as Thom sayeth, “there is nothing to fear, nothing to doubt” (Amnesiac, 2)— verily, in an interstellar burst he shall be back to save the universe (OK Computer, 1). Thou mayst not see him in the world as it is, this gunboat in a sea of fear (The Bends, 2), for Thom doth not belong here (Pablo Honey, 2). Repent of your sins, lest you go to hell for what your dirty mind is thinking (In Rainbows, 3); steer away from those rocks of evil, or thou shalt be a walking disaster (Hail to the Thief, 9). Therefore immerse your soul in love (The Bends, 12) with all your will, for the best thou can is good enough (Kid A, 6) and Thom shalt see thee in the next life (Kid A, 10).
I suspect the original Gospels were similarly interesting to the early Christians—it’s just that we (most of us, anyway) don’t get the in-jokes any more.
I think you’re most likely correct. Now you’ve made me think about it, the God-is-Love gambit is probably just misdirection.
Note to self: be careful what I express polite indifference to, because that can turn into a thought pattern as well as a speech pattern.
Actually, I favor the “response to the Euthyphro Dilemma” theory—if God is Good, then what God loves must be Good by definition, not by contrivance, and the dilemma collapses.
That is, if you ignore the contrivance that is “God is Good”.
Could you elaborate on how the second part follows from God = good?
As I understand it, “goodness” is being used in a somewhat confusing way there, referring to not only outcomes in the world and the actions which lead to those outcomes, but also preferences or personality traits which lead to those actions. In other words, there is a set of mental qualities which results in preferable outcomes (good) and a set which does not (evil); God has all of the former qualities and none of the latter, therefore similarity to God can be taken as evidence of goodness and vice-versa.
The main practical difference from Friendly AI is that God is presumed to already exist.
I assume it’s supposed to work like mass-energy equivalence or something, but I don’t actually believe it, so I can’t say.
Heh, fair enough.