Thanks for the link. Of course I should have checked that.... I’d like to point out that you find this in the second paragraph: “For an eudaemonist, happiness has intrinsic value”
Given the rest of what you’ve said, and my attachment to happiness as self-evidently valuable, a broader conception of “happiness” (as in eudamonia above) may avoid adverse outcomes like wireheading (assuming it is one). As other commenters here have noted there is no single definition anyway. You might say the broader it becomes, the less useful. Sure, but any measure would probably have to be really broad—like “utility”. When I said I don’t think ‘intrinsic worth’ is a thing, it’s because I was identifying it with utility, and… I guess I wasn’t thinking of (overall) utility as a ‘thing’ because to me, the concept is really vague and I just think of it an aggregate. An aggregate of things like happiness that contribute to utility.
I mentioned how if you’re going to call anything a terminal value, happiness seems like a good one. Now I don’t think so: you seem to be saying that you shouldn’t (edit: aren’t justified in considering) anything a terminal value other than utility itself, which seems reasonable. Is that right?
More to the point:
So why does ‘happiness’ get a free pass from this inspection?
I’m not sure; it now seems to me it oughtn’t to. Maybe another Less Wronger can contribute more, though not me.
Thanks for the link. Of course I should have checked that....
I’d like to point out that you find this in the second paragraph: “For an eudaemonist, happiness has intrinsic value”
Given the rest of what you’ve said, and my attachment to happiness as self-evidently valuable, a broader conception of “happiness” (as in eudamonia above) may avoid adverse outcomes like wireheading (assuming it is one). As other commenters here have noted there is no single definition anyway. You might say the broader it becomes, the less useful. Sure, but any measure would probably have to be really broad—like “utility”. When I said I don’t think ‘intrinsic worth’ is a thing, it’s because I was identifying it with utility, and… I guess I wasn’t thinking of (overall) utility as a ‘thing’ because to me, the concept is really vague and I just think of it an aggregate. An aggregate of things like happiness that contribute to utility.
I mentioned how if you’re going to call anything a terminal value, happiness seems like a good one. Now I don’t think so: you seem to be saying that you shouldn’t (edit: aren’t justified in considering) anything a terminal value other than utility itself, which seems reasonable. Is that right?
More to the point:
I’m not sure; it now seems to me it oughtn’t to. Maybe another Less Wronger can contribute more, though not me.
I’m just done. (I think I’m being stupid above.) Thanks.