There are all kinds of preferences, and distinguishing moral preferences from other types of preferences is still useful, even if you don’t believe that those preferences are commands from existence.
The Error Theorist might not call that a theory of morality. My reply to him is that what others call moral preferences have practical differences to hat preferences. Treating them all the same is throwing out the conceptual baby with the bathwater.
And others, perhaps you, might not want to call these theories “moral” either, because you seem to want “imperatives”, and my account of morality doesn’t include imperatives from the universe, or anything else.
The problem is that the line between what has felt like a “moral” preference and what has felt like some other kind of preference has been different in different social contexts. There may not even be agreement in a particular culture.
For example, some folks think an individual’s sexual preferences are “moral preferences,” such that a particular preference can be immoral. Other folks think a sexual preference is more like a gastric preference. Some people like broccoli, some don’t. Good and evil don’t enter into that discussion at all.
If the error theory were false, I would expect the line dividing different types of preferences would be more stable over time, even if value drift caused moral preferences to change over time. In other words, the Aztecs thought human sacrifice was good, we now think it is evil. But the question has always been understood as a moral question. I’m asserting that some questions have not always been seen as “moral” questions, and the movement of that line is evidence for the error theory.
If the error theory were false, I would expect the line dividing different types of preferences would be more stable over time, even if value drift caused moral preferences to change over time.
The line between “truth” and “belief” is also not stable across cultures.
I meant in the same sense that you meant the statement about cultures, i.e., if you ask an average member of the culture, you’ll get different answers for what is true depending on the culture.
I was talking about community consensus, not whatever nonsense is being spouted by the man-on-the-street.
As you noted, the belief of the average person is seldom a reliable indicator (our even all that coherent). That’s why we don’t measure a society’s scientific knowledge that way.
There are all kinds of preferences, and distinguishing moral preferences from other types of preferences is still useful, even if you don’t believe that those preferences are commands from existence.
The Error Theorist might not call that a theory of morality. My reply to him is that what others call moral preferences have practical differences to hat preferences. Treating them all the same is throwing out the conceptual baby with the bathwater.
And others, perhaps you, might not want to call these theories “moral” either, because you seem to want “imperatives”, and my account of morality doesn’t include imperatives from the universe, or anything else.
The problem is that the line between what has felt like a “moral” preference and what has felt like some other kind of preference has been different in different social contexts. There may not even be agreement in a particular culture.
For example, some folks think an individual’s sexual preferences are “moral preferences,” such that a particular preference can be immoral. Other folks think a sexual preference is more like a gastric preference. Some people like broccoli, some don’t. Good and evil don’t enter into that discussion at all.
If the error theory were false, I would expect the line dividing different types of preferences would be more stable over time, even if value drift caused moral preferences to change over time. In other words, the Aztecs thought human sacrifice was good, we now think it is evil. But the question has always been understood as a moral question. I’m asserting that some questions have not always been seen as “moral” questions, and the movement of that line is evidence for the error theory.
The line between “truth” and “belief” is also not stable across cultures.
The line between “true” and “not true” is different in different cultures? I wasn’t aware that airplanes don’t work in China.
I meant in the same sense that you meant the statement about cultures, i.e., if you ask an average member of the culture, you’ll get different answers for what is true depending on the culture.
I was talking about community consensus, not whatever nonsense is being spouted by the man-on-the-street.
As you noted, the belief of the average person is seldom a reliable indicator (our even all that coherent). That’s why we don’t measure a society’s scientific knowledge that way.
Ok, my point still stands.