Regarding approval ratings on products using stars...
...I’d like to point out that a strategic voter using literal “star” voting should generally always collapse down to “5 stars for the good ones, 0 stars for everyone else”.
This is de facto approval voting, and a strategic voter doing approval voting learns to restrict their approval to ONLY the “electable favorite”, which de facto gives you FPTP all over gain.
And FPTP is terrible.
Among the quoted takes, this was the best, about the sadness of the star voting systems, because it was practical, and placed the blame where it properly belongs: on the designers and maintainers of the central parts of the system.
Nobe: On Etsy you lose your “star seller” rating if it dips below 4.8. A couple of times I’ve gotten 4 stars and I’ve been beside myself wondering what I did wrong even when the comment is like “I love it, I’ll cherish it forever”
My belief is that LW-ers who are into these things naively think that “stars on my ballot would be like a proxy for my estimate of the utility estimate, and utility estimates would be the best thing (and surely everyone (just like me) would not engage in strategic voting to break this pleasing macro property of the aggregation method (that arises if everyone is honest and good and smart like I am))”.
Which makes sense, for people from LessWrong, who are generally not cynical enough about how a slight admixture of truly bad faith (or just really stupid) players, plus everyone else “coping with reality” often leads to bad situations.
Like the bad situation you see on Etsy, with Etsy’s rating system.
...
Its weird to me that LW somehow stopped believing (or propagating the belief very far?) that money is the unit of caring.
When you propagate this belief quite far, I think you end up with assurance contracts instead of voting. for almost all “domestic” or “normal” issues.
And when you notice how using money to vote in politics is often considered a corrupt practice, its pretty natural to get confused.
You wouldn’t let your literal enemy in literal war spend the tiny amount it would (probably) cost to bribe your own personal commander in chief to be nice to your enemy while your enemy plunders your country at a profit relative (to the size of the bribe)...
...and so then you should realize that your internal political system NEEDS security mindset, and you should be trying to get literally the most secure possible method to get literally the best possible “trusted component” in your communal system for defending the community.
The reason THIS is necessary is that we live in a world of hobbesian horror. This is the real state of affairs on the international stage. There are no global elected leaders who endorse globally acceptable moral principles for the entire world.
(((Proposing to elect such a person democratically over all the voters in China, India, Africa, and the Middle East swiftly leads reasonable and wise Americans to get cold feet. I’m not so crazy as to propose this… yet… and I don’t want to talk about multi-cultural “fully collective” extrapolated volition here. But I will say that I personal suspect “extrapolated volition and exit rights” is probably better than “collective extrapolated volition” when it comes to superintelligent benevolence algorithms.)))
In lots of modern spy movies, the “home office” gets subverted, and the spy hero has to “go it alone”.
That story-like trope is useful for symbolically and narratively explaining the problem America is facing, since our constitution has this giant festering bug in the math of elections, and its going to be almost impossible for us to even patch the bug.
The metaphorical situation where “the hero can’t actually highly trust the home office in this spy movie” is the real situation for almost all of us because “ameicans (and people outside of America) can’t actually highly trust America’s president selected by America’s actual elections”… because in the movie, the home office was broken because it was low security, and in real life out elections are broken because they have low security… just like Etsy’s rating systems are broken because they are badly designed.
Creating systemic and justified trust is the EXACT issue shared across all examples: random spy movies, each US election, and Etsy.
A traditional way to solve this is to publicly and verifiably selecting a clear single human leader (assuming we’re not punting, and putting AI in charge yet) to be actually trusted.
Biden was probably against that stuff? I think that’s part of why he insisted on getting out of Afghanistan?
But our timeline got really really really lucky that an actually moral man might have been in the whitehouse for a short period of history from 2020 to 2024. But that was mostly random.
FPTP generates random presidents.
Approval voting collapses down to FPTP under strategy and would (under optimization pressure) also generate random presidents.
Star voting collapses down to approval voting under strategy and would (under optimization pressure) also generate random presidents.
I’ve thought about this a lot, and I think that the warfighting part of a country needs an elected civilian commander in chief, and the single best criteria for picking someone to fill that role is the Condorcet Criterion and from there I’m not as strongly certain, but I think the most secure way to hit that criterion with a practical implementation that has quite a few other properties include Schulze and Ranked Pair ballot tabulation…
...neither of which use “stars”, which is a stupid choice for preference aggregation!!
a strategic voter doing approval voting learns to restrict their approval to ONLY the “electable favorite”, which de facto gives you FPTP all over gain.
Wouldn’t you restrict your approval to your favorite of the frontrunners, and every candidate you like better than that one? I don’t see how you do worse by doing that under vanilla Approval Voting.
That leaves some favorable properties compared to FPTP
If there’s a candidate perceived as unelectable, but secretly most people like him more than the frontrunners, he will win under strategic approval voting.
It is true that there are some favorable properties that many systems other than the best system has compared to FPTP.
I like methods that are cloneproof and which can’t be spoofed by irrelevant alternatives, and if there is ONLY a choice between “something mediocre” and “something mediocre with one less negative feature” then I guess I’ll be in favor of hill climbing since “some mysterious force” somehow prevents “us” from doing the best thing.
However, I think cloning and independence are “nice to haves” whereas the condorcet criterion is probably a “need to have”
((The biggest design fear I have is actually the “participation criterion”. One of the very very few virtues of FPTP is that it at least satisfies the criterion where someone showing up and “wasting their vote on a third party” doesn’t cause their least preferred candidate to jump ahead of a more preferred candidate. But something similar can happen in every method I know of that reliably selects the Condorcet Winner when one exists :-(
Mathematically, I’ve begun to worry that maybe I should try to prove that Condorcet and Participation simply cannot both be satisfied at the same time?
Pragmatically, I’m not sure what it looks like to “attack people’s will to vote” (or troll sad people into voting in ways that harm their interests and have the sad people fight back righteously by insisting that they shouldn’t vote, because voting really will net harm their interests).
One can hope that people will simply “want to vote” because it make civic sense, but it actually looks like a huge number of humans are biased to feel like a peasant, and to have a desire to be ruled? Or something? And maybe you can just make it “against the law to not vote” (like in Australia) but maybe that won’t solve the problems that could hypothetically “sociologically arise” from losing the participation criterion in ways that might be hard to foresee.))
In general, I think people should advocate for the BEST thing. The BEST thing I currently know of for picking an elected civilian commander in chief is “Ranked Pairs tabulation over Preference Ballots (with a law that requires everyone to vote during the two day Voting Holiday)”.
Regarding approval ratings on products using stars...
...I’d like to point out that a strategic voter using literal “star” voting should generally always collapse down to “5 stars for the good ones, 0 stars for everyone else”.
This is de facto approval voting, and a strategic voter doing approval voting learns to restrict their approval to ONLY the “electable favorite”, which de facto gives you FPTP all over gain.
And FPTP is terrible.
Among the quoted takes, this was the best, about the sadness of the star voting systems, because it was practical, and placed the blame where it properly belongs: on the designers and maintainers of the central parts of the system.
If you look at LessWrong, you’ll find a weirdly large number of people into Star Voting but they don’t account for “the new meta” that it would predictably introduce. (Approval voting also gets some love, but less.)
My belief is that LW-ers who are into these things naively think that “stars on my ballot would be like a proxy for my estimate of the utility estimate, and utility estimates would be the best thing (and surely everyone (just like me) would not engage in strategic voting to break this pleasing macro property of the aggregation method (that arises if everyone is honest and good and smart like I am))”.
Which makes sense, for people from LessWrong, who are generally not cynical enough about how a slight admixture of truly bad faith (or just really stupid) players, plus everyone else “coping with reality” often leads to bad situations.
Like the bad situation you see on Etsy, with Etsy’s rating system.
...
Its weird to me that LW somehow stopped believing (or propagating the belief very far?) that money is the unit of caring.
When you propagate this belief quite far, I think you end up with assurance contracts instead of voting. for almost all “domestic” or “normal” issues.
And when you notice how using money to vote in politics is often considered a corrupt practice, its pretty natural to get confused.
You wouldn’t let your literal enemy in literal war spend the tiny amount it would (probably) cost to bribe your own personal commander in chief to be nice to your enemy while your enemy plunders your country at a profit relative (to the size of the bribe)...
...and so then you should realize that your internal political system NEEDS security mindset, and you should be trying to get literally the most secure possible method to get literally the best possible “trusted component” in your communal system for defending the community.
The reason THIS is necessary is that we live in a world of hobbesian horror. This is the real state of affairs on the international stage. There are no global elected leaders who endorse globally acceptable moral principles for the entire world.
(((Proposing to elect such a person democratically over all the voters in China, India, Africa, and the Middle East swiftly leads reasonable and wise Americans to get cold feet. I’m not so crazy as to propose this… yet… and I don’t want to talk about multi-cultural “fully collective” extrapolated volition here. But I will say that I personal suspect “extrapolated volition and exit rights” is probably better than “collective extrapolated volition” when it comes to superintelligent benevolence algorithms.)))
In lots of modern spy movies, the “home office” gets subverted, and the spy hero has to “go it alone”.
That story-like trope is useful for symbolically and narratively explaining the problem America is facing, since our constitution has this giant festering bug in the math of elections, and its going to be almost impossible for us to even patch the bug.
The metaphorical situation where “the hero can’t actually highly trust the home office in this spy movie” is the real situation for almost all of us because “ameicans (and people outside of America) can’t actually highly trust America’s president selected by America’s actual elections”… because in the movie, the home office was broken because it was low security, and in real life out elections are broken because they have low security… just like Etsy’s rating systems are broken because they are badly designed.
Creating systemic and justified trust is the EXACT issue shared across all examples: random spy movies, each US election, and Etsy.
A traditional way to solve this is to publicly and verifiably selecting a clear single human leader (assuming we’re not punting, and putting AI in charge yet) to be actually trusted.
You need someone who CAN and who SHOULD have authority over your domestic intelligence community, because otherwise your domestic intelligence community will have no real public leader and once you’re in that state of affairs, you have no way to know they haven’t gone entirely off the rails into 100% private corruption for the pure hedonic enjoyment of private power over weak humans who can’t defend themselves because they gain sexual enjoyment from watching humans suffer at their hands.
Biden was probably against that stuff? I think that’s part of why he insisted on getting out of Afghanistan?
But our timeline got really really really lucky that an actually moral man might have been in the whitehouse for a short period of history from 2020 to 2024. But that was mostly random.
FPTP generates random presidents.
Approval voting collapses down to FPTP under strategy and would (under optimization pressure) also generate random presidents.
Star voting collapses down to approval voting under strategy and would (under optimization pressure) also generate random presidents.
I’ve thought about this a lot, and I think that the warfighting part of a country needs an elected civilian commander in chief, and the single best criteria for picking someone to fill that role is the Condorcet Criterion and from there I’m not as strongly certain, but I think the most secure way to hit that criterion with a practical implementation that has quite a few other properties include Schulze and Ranked Pair ballot tabulation…
...neither of which use “stars”, which is a stupid choice for preference aggregation!!
Star voting is stupid.
Wouldn’t you restrict your approval to your favorite of the frontrunners, and every candidate you like better than that one? I don’t see how you do worse by doing that under vanilla Approval Voting.
That leaves some favorable properties compared to FPTP
If there’s a candidate perceived as unelectable, but secretly most people like him more than the frontrunners, he will win under strategic approval voting.
Clone candidates don’t split the vote.
It is true that there are some favorable properties that many systems other than the best system has compared to FPTP.
I like methods that are cloneproof and which can’t be spoofed by irrelevant alternatives, and if there is ONLY a choice between “something mediocre” and “something mediocre with one less negative feature” then I guess I’ll be in favor of hill climbing since “some mysterious force” somehow prevents “us” from doing the best thing.
However, I think cloning and independence are “nice to haves” whereas the condorcet criterion is probably a “need to have”
((The biggest design fear I have is actually the “participation criterion”. One of the very very few virtues of FPTP is that it at least satisfies the criterion where someone showing up and “wasting their vote on a third party” doesn’t cause their least preferred candidate to jump ahead of a more preferred candidate. But something similar can happen in every method I know of that reliably selects the Condorcet Winner when one exists :-(
Mathematically, I’ve begun to worry that maybe I should try to prove that Condorcet and Participation simply cannot both be satisfied at the same time?
Pragmatically, I’m not sure what it looks like to “attack people’s will to vote” (or troll sad people into voting in ways that harm their interests and have the sad people fight back righteously by insisting that they shouldn’t vote, because voting really will net harm their interests).
One can hope that people will simply “want to vote” because it make civic sense, but it actually looks like a huge number of humans are biased to feel like a peasant, and to have a desire to be ruled? Or something? And maybe you can just make it “against the law to not vote” (like in Australia) but maybe that won’t solve the problems that could hypothetically “sociologically arise” from losing the participation criterion in ways that might be hard to foresee.))
In general, I think people should advocate for the BEST thing. The BEST thing I currently know of for picking an elected civilian commander in chief is “Ranked Pairs tabulation over Preference Ballots (with a law that requires everyone to vote during the two day Voting Holiday)”.