All right, I found another nice illustration. Some philosophers today think that Newcomb’s problem is a model of certain real-world situations. Here’s a typical specimen of this idiocy, retyped verbatim from here:
Let me describe a typical medical Newcomb problem. It has long been recognized that in people susceptible to migraine, the onset of an attack tends to follow the consumption of certain foods, including chocolate and red wine. It has usually been assumed that these foods are causal factors, in some way triggering attacks. This belief has been the source of much mental and physical anguish for those susceptible both to migraines and to the attractions of these substances. Recently however an alternative theory has come to light. It has been discovered that eating chocolate is not a cause of migraine, but a joint effect of some pre-migrainous state (or ‘PMS’, as we doctors say). The physiological changes that comprise PMS thus typically increase a subject’s desire for chocolate, as well as leading, later, to the usual physical symptoms of migraine.
The article goes on to suggest that, in a sufficiently freaky decision theory, abstaining from chocolate can still help. Yes, folks, this is the best real-world scenario they could come up with. I rest my case .
Newcomb-like problems arise when there is a causal thread passing through your cognitive algorithm which produces the correlation. There is no causality going through your cognitive algorithm to the migraine here. The author doesn’t know what a newcomb-like problem is.
But evidential actually tells you not to eat the chocolate? That’s a pretty spectacular failure mode—it seems like it could be extended to not taking your loved ones to the hospital because people tend to die there.
All right, I found another nice illustration. Some philosophers today think that Newcomb’s problem is a model of certain real-world situations. Here’s a typical specimen of this idiocy, retyped verbatim from here:
Let me describe a typical medical Newcomb problem. It has long been recognized that in people susceptible to migraine, the onset of an attack tends to follow the consumption of certain foods, including chocolate and red wine. It has usually been assumed that these foods are causal factors, in some way triggering attacks. This belief has been the source of much mental and physical anguish for those susceptible both to migraines and to the attractions of these substances. Recently however an alternative theory has come to light. It has been discovered that eating chocolate is not a cause of migraine, but a joint effect of some pre-migrainous state (or ‘PMS’, as we doctors say). The physiological changes that comprise PMS thus typically increase a subject’s desire for chocolate, as well as leading, later, to the usual physical symptoms of migraine.
The article goes on to suggest that, in a sufficiently freaky decision theory, abstaining from chocolate can still help. Yes, folks, this is the best real-world scenario they could come up with. I rest my case .
Newcomb-like problems arise when there is a causal thread passing through your cognitive algorithm which produces the correlation. There is no causality going through your cognitive algorithm to the migraine here. The author doesn’t know what a newcomb-like problem is.
Some authors define “Newcomblike problem” as one that brings evidential and decision theory into conflict, which this does.
So… in Newcomb’s problem, evidential says one-box, causal says two-box, causal clearly fails.
In Chocolate problem, evidential says avoid chocolate, causal says eat the chocolate, evidential clearly fails.
Thus neither theory is adequate.
Is that right?
I assume it’s a typo: evidential vs. causal decision theories.
Evidential decision theory wins for the wrong reasons, and causal decision theory just fails.
But evidential actually tells you not to eat the chocolate? That’s a pretty spectacular failure mode—it seems like it could be extended to not taking your loved ones to the hospital because people tend to die there.
Yeah, that was awkwardly worded, I was only referring to Newcomb.
I assume it’s a typo: evidential vs. causal decision theories.