I feel like I am really missing something here. I don’t see how the modal argument is supposed to work. I have lots of evidence that I am conscious in this world. But how is that evidence supposed to help when I move to a different world—one in which I may or may not be a foobar?
At a first pass, I just don’t know how to parse the claims you are making. Are you saying, for example, that P(I am a foobar in this world) < P(A foobar is conscious in this world), or P(I am a foobar in some possible world) < P(A foobar is conscious in some possible world), or … ?
At a second pass, I’m not sure how to evaluate the probability of modal claims.
At a third pass, I’m worried that your argument equivocates on the interpretation of probability in your two assumptions. The first assumption—that P(I’m a foobar) > P(A foobar can be conscious) -- seems to use a modal relative frequency interpretation: where the probability of an event is the frequency of possible worlds in which the event occurs. The second assumption—that P(I’m conscious) is nearly one—seems to use an evidentialist or maybe personalist view of probability. But I don’t think these two can be combined unless you have some principle by which evidence that I am conscious in this world is also evidence that I am conscious in nearly every possible world.
I feel like I am really missing something here. I don’t see how the modal argument is supposed to work. I have lots of evidence that I am conscious in this world. But how is that evidence supposed to help when I move to a different world—one in which I may or may not be a foobar?
At a first pass, I just don’t know how to parse the claims you are making. Are you saying, for example, that P(I am a foobar in this world) < P(A foobar is conscious in this world), or P(I am a foobar in some possible world) < P(A foobar is conscious in some possible world), or … ?
At a second pass, I’m not sure how to evaluate the probability of modal claims.
At a third pass, I’m worried that your argument equivocates on the interpretation of probability in your two assumptions. The first assumption—that P(I’m a foobar) > P(A foobar can be conscious) -- seems to use a modal relative frequency interpretation: where the probability of an event is the frequency of possible worlds in which the event occurs. The second assumption—that P(I’m conscious) is nearly one—seems to use an evidentialist or maybe personalist view of probability. But I don’t think these two can be combined unless you have some principle by which evidence that I am conscious in this world is also evidence that I am conscious in nearly every possible world.
Could you try explaining in more detail?