That’s not even an example of the ad hominem fallacy.
“You have an ugly face, so you’re wrong” is ad hominem. “You have an ugly face” is not. It’s just a statement. Did the speaker imply the second part? Maybe… but probably not. It was probably just an insulting rejoinder.
Insults, i.e. “Attacking you, not your argument”, is not what ad hominem is. It’s a fallacy, remember? It’s no error in reasoning to call a person ugly. Only when you conclude from this that they are wrong do you commit the fallacy.
So:
A: It’s wrong to stab your neighbor and take their stuff. B: Your face is ugly. A: The ugliness of my face has no bearing on moral... B, interrupting: Didn’t say it does! Your face is still ugly!
Did the speaker imply the second part? Maybe… but probably not.
They did not logically entail it but they did conversationally implicate it (see CGEL, p. 33 and following, for the difference). As per Grice’s maxim of relation, people don’t normally bring up irrelevant information.
B, interrupting: Didn’t say it does!
At which point A would be justified in asking, “Why did you bring it up then?” And even if B had (tried to) explicitly cancel the pragmatic implicature (“It’s wrong to stab your neighbor and take their stuff”—”I won’t comment on that; on a totally unrelated note, your face is ugly”), A would still be justified in asking “Why did you change the topic?”
B here is violating Grice’s maxims. That’s the point. He’s not following the cooperative principle. He’s trying to insult A (perhaps because he is frustrated with the conversation). So applying Gricean reasoning to deduce B’s intended meaning is incorrect.
If A asks “why are you changing the subject?”, B’s answer would likely be something along the lines of “And your mother’s face is ugly too!”.
My point is that Grice’s maxims, useful though they are, do not fully capture how human conversation goes — most notably, those cases in which at least one party has a hostile or uncooperative attitude toward the other. People in such cases do get that they’re being insulted or whatever; A, as you portray him, comes off as simply bad at understanding non-literal meaning (or he is being intentionally obstructive/pedantic).
“You have an ugly face, so you’re wrong” is ad hominem. “You have an ugly face” is not. It’s just a statement. Did the speaker imply the second part? Maybe… but probably not.
I contest the empirical claim you are making about human behaviour. That reply in that context very nearly always constitutes arguing against the point the other is making. In particular, the example to which you are replying most definitely is an example of a fallacious ad hominem.
A: The ugliness of my face has no bearing on moral…
In common practice it does. The rules do change based on attractiveness. (Tangential.)
That’s not even an example of the ad hominem fallacy.
“You have an ugly face, so you’re wrong” is ad hominem. “You have an ugly face” is not. It’s just a statement. Did the speaker imply the second part? Maybe… but probably not. It was probably just an insulting rejoinder.
Insults, i.e. “Attacking you, not your argument”, is not what ad hominem is. It’s a fallacy, remember? It’s no error in reasoning to call a person ugly. Only when you conclude from this that they are wrong do you commit the fallacy.
So:
A: It’s wrong to stab your neighbor and take their stuff.
B: Your face is ugly.
A: The ugliness of my face has no bearing on moral...
B, interrupting: Didn’t say it does! Your face is still ugly!
They did not logically entail it but they did conversationally implicate it (see CGEL, p. 33 and following, for the difference). As per Grice’s maxim of relation, people don’t normally bring up irrelevant information.
At which point A would be justified in asking, “Why did you bring it up then?” And even if B had (tried to) explicitly cancel the pragmatic implicature (“It’s wrong to stab your neighbor and take their stuff”—”I won’t comment on that; on a totally unrelated note, your face is ugly”), A would still be justified in asking “Why did you change the topic?”
B here is violating Grice’s maxims. That’s the point. He’s not following the cooperative principle. He’s trying to insult A (perhaps because he is frustrated with the conversation). So applying Gricean reasoning to deduce B’s intended meaning is incorrect.
If A asks “why are you changing the subject?”, B’s answer would likely be something along the lines of “And your mother’s face is ugly too!”.
Then he doesn’t get to complain when people mis-get his point.
My point is that Grice’s maxims, useful though they are, do not fully capture how human conversation goes — most notably, those cases in which at least one party has a hostile or uncooperative attitude toward the other. People in such cases do get that they’re being insulted or whatever; A, as you portray him, comes off as simply bad at understanding non-literal meaning (or he is being intentionally obstructive/pedantic).
I contest the empirical claim you are making about human behaviour. That reply in that context very nearly always constitutes arguing against the point the other is making. In particular, the example to which you are replying most definitely is an example of a fallacious ad hominem.
In common practice it does. The rules do change based on attractiveness. (Tangential.)
But A hadn’t specified who the stabber is or who the stabbee is.
The effect of the fallacy can be implied, can’t it?
Can be and usually is (implied).