I think that there’s a process we can meaningfully point to and call qualia, and it includes all the things we think of as qualia, but qualia is not itself a thing per se but rather the reification of observations of mental processes that allows us to make sense of them.
I have theories of what these processes are and how they work and they mostly line up with the what’s pointed at by this book. In particular I think cybernetic models are sufficient to explain most of the interesting things going on with consciousness, and we can mostly think of qualia as the result of neurons in the brain hooked up in loops so that their inputs include information not only from other neurons but also from themselves, and these self-sensing loops provide the input stream of data that other neurons interpret as self-experience/qualia/consciousness.
but qualia is not itself a thing per se but rather the reification of observations of mental processes
I don’t see how that helps. We don’t have a reductive explanation of consciousness as a thing, and we don’t have a reductive explanation of consciousness as a process.
I think that there’s a process we can meaningfully point to and call qualia, and it includes all the things we think of as qualia, but qualia is not itself a thing per se but rather the reification of observations of mental processes that allows us to make sense of them.
I have theories of what these processes are and how they work and they mostly line up with the what’s pointed at by this book. In particular I think cybernetic models are sufficient to explain most of the interesting things going on with consciousness, and we can mostly think of qualia as the result of neurons in the brain hooked up in loops so that their inputs include information not only from other neurons but also from themselves, and these self-sensing loops provide the input stream of data that other neurons interpret as self-experience/qualia/consciousness.
I don’t see how that helps. We don’t have a reductive explanation of consciousness as a thing, and we don’t have a reductive explanation of consciousness as a process.