I like to think of my “true values” as (initially) unknown, and my moral intuitions as evidence of, and approximations to, those true values. I can then work on improving the error margins, confidence intervals, and so forth.
So do I, but I worry that they are not uniquely defined by the evidence. I may eventually be moved to unique values by irrational arguments, but if those values are different from my current true values than I will have lost something and if I don’t have any true values than my search for values will have been pointless, though my future self will be okay with that.
I like to think of my “true values” as (initially) unknown, and my moral intuitions as evidence of, and approximations to, those true values. I can then work on improving the error margins, confidence intervals, and so forth.
So do I, but I worry that they are not uniquely defined by the evidence. I may eventually be moved to unique values by irrational arguments, but if those values are different from my current true values than I will have lost something and if I don’t have any true values than my search for values will have been pointless, though my future self will be okay with that.