If asked, they would say that they’re glad to have existed [...]
There is an interesting question here: What does it mean to say that I’m glad to have been born? Or rather, what does it mean to say that I prefer to have been born?
The alternative scenario in which I was never born is strictly counterfactual. I can only have a revealed preference for having been born if I use a timeless/updateless decision theory. In order to determine my preference you’d need to perform an experiment like the following:
Omega approaches me and offers me $100. It tells me that it had an opportunity to prevent my birth, and it would have prevented my birth if and only if it had predicted that I would accept the $100. It is a good predictor. Do I take the $100?
Now if you know I’m an altruist, then the problem is simpler: I prefer to have been born insofar as I prefer any arbitrary person to have been born, and this preference can be detected with the thought experiment described in the OP.
… unless I’m a preference utilitarian, in which case I prefer an arbitrary person to have been born only if they prefer to have been born.
I like that formulation. One question: would I be able to remember having lived them while I was reliving them? Because then it would be more boring than the first time.
If the subject were not allowed to remember their first life while living the second, we would want to know how the subject feels about copies of themself.
There is an interesting question here: What does it mean to say that I’m glad to have been born? Or rather, what does it mean to say that I prefer to have been born?
The alternative scenario in which I was never born is strictly counterfactual. I can only have a revealed preference for having been born if I use a timeless/updateless decision theory. In order to determine my preference you’d need to perform an experiment like the following:
Omega approaches me and offers me $100. It tells me that it had an opportunity to prevent my birth, and it would have prevented my birth if and only if it had predicted that I would accept the $100. It is a good predictor. Do I take the $100?
Without thinking about such an experiment, it’s not clear what my preference is. More significantly, when 30% of American adolescents in 1930 wish they had never been born, it is not clear exactly what they mean.
Now if you know I’m an altruist, then the problem is simpler: I prefer to have been born insofar as I prefer any arbitrary person to have been born, and this preference can be detected with the thought experiment described in the OP.
… unless I’m a preference utilitarian, in which case I prefer an arbitrary person to have been born only if they prefer to have been born.
How about: Given the chance, would you rather die a natural death, or relive all your life experiences first?
I like that formulation. One question: would I be able to remember having lived them while I was reliving them? Because then it would be more boring than the first time.
If the subject were not allowed to remember their first life while living the second, we would want to know how the subject feels about copies of themself.