I thought of a situation in which individuals seem to act irrationally, but I don’t know of any cognitive bias that would cause them to. Some individuals seem willing to fight in wars to “help out” in it despite having a small risk of being killed in it. E.g. some are willing to have a 1⁄100 chance of being killed if they have a 1⁄100,000 chance of causing their nation to win the war, meaning that if they decided not to join the war, their nation would be 1⁄100,000 more likely to lose. However, people seem much less willing to have a 1⁄1 chance of being killed and a 1/1000 chance of causing their nation to win the war. Assuming one’s utility is a weighted linear sum of whether they died or not (with 1 meaning they died and 0 meaning they lived) and whether their nation lost the war or not (with 1 meaning lose and 0 meaning win), I don’t know of any weights that would make it both worth fighting in the former scenario but not worth fighting in the latter. Are people just acting irrationally or is my model wrong? If they are acting irrationally, what bias is causing them to do so?
Linearity is a very strong assumption. A linear approximation is fine when you’re looking at the difference between a 1% chance to die and a 2% chance to die, but overall the phenomena may exhibit nonlinear behavior.
People fight in war because they want to win, but most are willing to lose rather than die. Choosing to fight means that you’d rather risk of death or injury instead of submitting to your foe. The very act of fighting back already may mean that you get offered better terms. It also signals to others that you won’t submit easily. There are benefits to fighting besides victory.
The cost of defeat is definitely a factor. Losing a war in sub-Saharan Africa won’t affect the average American’s day, but if Mecha-Hitler invaded at the head of an army of Nazi vampires, I’m sure people would be willing to tolerate a much higher risk of death when deciding whether to sign up.
They don’t work that way because humans’ utility is not a weighted linear sum, and humans don’t make decisions on the basis of a single calculated number, anyway.
I’m not so sure about that. IIRC, people tend to overweight risks with small probabilities, which would make them more reluctant to take the 1⁄100 risk of death. That said, people tend to be overconfident, which might make them think their chance of death is < 1⁄100, so perhaps this biases would to some extent cancel eachother out.
In many wars, those who fight get a much higher reputation than those who were expected to fight but refused. This has often translated into a reproductive advantage for those who fought. It’s not obviously irrational to want that reproductive advantage or something associated with it.
Maybe it’s slightly-dishonest signaling—the soldiers prefer not to die far more strongly than they prefer that their country wins, but they claim otherwise because societies reward those who profess to share the society’s interests. Society also pays them for being soldiers, with money and social status. Joining the army is also a good costly signal of all-round fitness, resilience, political affiliation, etc.
I thought of a situation in which individuals seem to act irrationally, but I don’t know of any cognitive bias that would cause them to. Some individuals seem willing to fight in wars to “help out” in it despite having a small risk of being killed in it. E.g. some are willing to have a 1⁄100 chance of being killed if they have a 1⁄100,000 chance of causing their nation to win the war, meaning that if they decided not to join the war, their nation would be 1⁄100,000 more likely to lose. However, people seem much less willing to have a 1⁄1 chance of being killed and a 1/1000 chance of causing their nation to win the war. Assuming one’s utility is a weighted linear sum of whether they died or not (with 1 meaning they died and 0 meaning they lived) and whether their nation lost the war or not (with 1 meaning lose and 0 meaning win), I don’t know of any weights that would make it both worth fighting in the former scenario but not worth fighting in the latter. Are people just acting irrationally or is my model wrong? If they are acting irrationally, what bias is causing them to do so?
I think your model is wrong. Humans don’t work that way.
They don’t work that way because they are going to war to increase status, by failing to register small risks, or for some other reason?
Linearity is a very strong assumption. A linear approximation is fine when you’re looking at the difference between a 1% chance to die and a 2% chance to die, but overall the phenomena may exhibit nonlinear behavior.
People fight in war because they want to win, but most are willing to lose rather than die. Choosing to fight means that you’d rather risk of death or injury instead of submitting to your foe. The very act of fighting back already may mean that you get offered better terms. It also signals to others that you won’t submit easily. There are benefits to fighting besides victory.
The cost of defeat is definitely a factor. Losing a war in sub-Saharan Africa won’t affect the average American’s day, but if Mecha-Hitler invaded at the head of an army of Nazi vampires, I’m sure people would be willing to tolerate a much higher risk of death when deciding whether to sign up.
They don’t work that way because humans’ utility is not a weighted linear sum, and humans don’t make decisions on the basis of a single calculated number, anyway.
They may effectively treat the 1⁄100 chance as zero. Or fail to realize in “near mode” what exactly do they risk.
Give them a 1⁄1 chance, and suddenly it is not zero, and the consequences are very clear.
I’m not so sure about that. IIRC, people tend to overweight risks with small probabilities, which would make them more reluctant to take the 1⁄100 risk of death. That said, people tend to be overconfident, which might make them think their chance of death is < 1⁄100, so perhaps this biases would to some extent cancel eachother out.
In many wars, those who fight get a much higher reputation than those who were expected to fight but refused. This has often translated into a reproductive advantage for those who fought. It’s not obviously irrational to want that reproductive advantage or something associated with it.
Maybe it’s slightly-dishonest signaling—the soldiers prefer not to die far more strongly than they prefer that their country wins, but they claim otherwise because societies reward those who profess to share the society’s interests. Society also pays them for being soldiers, with money and social status. Joining the army is also a good costly signal of all-round fitness, resilience, political affiliation, etc.