However, since SIA is a positive theory, this means that Rawlsianism must also be a positive, not a normative, theory. Take this as a paradox, if you will.
I see what you mean where you’re testing a key assumption of liberalism or Heideggerianism, not the theory as a whole. Rawlsianism, however, includes min-maxing as well, which seems more normative.
This leads me to suspect that there is a well-established connection between moral philosophy and anthropic reasoning that flows from the former to the latter. Please let me know if that is the case.
If you are behind a veil of ignorance and optimize expected utility under SSA, then you will want the average utility in your universe to be as high as possible.
SIA is a bit more complicated. But we can observe that SIA gives the same posterior predictions if we add extra observers to each universe so they have the same population, and these observers observe something special that indicates they’re an extra observer, and their quality of life is 0 (i.e. they’re indifferent to existing). In this case, someone reasoning behind the veil of ignorance and maximizing expected utility will want total utility to be as high as possible; it’s better for someone to exist iff their personal utility exceeds 0, since they’re replacing an empty observer.
As for Heideggerianism, I agree that it does not necessarily “correspond” to SSA in any way. However, I do feel that it is likely incompatible with SIA. As noted in my post, I am a bit uncertain about the consequences of Heideggerianism, so I am happy to change my argument to a more general “parochial” vs. “non-parochial” form, using the language you have suggested.
I see that Rawlsianism requires an original position. But such an original position is required for both SSA and SIA. To my mind, the difference is that the SSA original position is just a prior over universes, while the SIA original position includes both a prior over universes and an assumption of subjective existence, which is more likely to be true of universes with high population. Both SSA and SIA agree that you aren’t in an empty universe a priori, but that’s an edge case; SIA scales continuously with population while SSA just has a step from 0 to 1.
Heidegerrianism doesn’t seem to believe in an objective universe in a direct sense, e.g. the being of tools is not the being of the dynamical physical system that a physicalist would take to correspond to the tool, because the tool also has the affordance of using it. So it’s unclear how to reconcile Heideggerianism with anthropics as a whole. I’m speculating on various political correspondences but I don’t see how to get them from Heideggerianism and anthropics, just noting possible similarities in conclusions.
Rawlsianism, however, includes min-maxing as well, which seems more normative.
I agree that the min-maxing of Rawlsianism is purely normative. What I was getting at was the veil of ignorance itself. Perhaps, it is worth explicitly saying, “oops, I forgot about that,” for this point.
If you are behind a veil of ignorance and optimize expected utility under SSA, then you will want the average utility in your universe to be as high as possible.
Yes, I agree. However, I still feel that if you are willing to believe in the veil of ignorance, you should also believe in SIA.
But such an original position is required for both SSA and SIA. To my mind, the difference is that the SSA original position is just a prior over universes, while the SIA original position includes both a prior over universes and an assumption of subjective existence, which is more likely to be true of universes with high population.
Again, I agree. However, I feel that the veil of ignorance needs both the prior over universes and the prior before the assumption of subjective existence since it is willing to modify existential properties of the observer, without which the observer would not have the same subjective existence.
Heidegerrianism doesn’t seem to believe in an objective universe in a direct sense
This is the very reason I believe that it should be OK with the “prior over universes” present in SSA. If reality is not objective, then it is easier to understand this prior as “uncertainty regarding the population of this universe” rather than “the potential of being in another universe which has a different population.” The potential universes and the actual universe become ontologically more similar since they are both non-objective. I have to admit that this is the point I am least certain of, though.
I see what you mean where you’re testing a key assumption of liberalism or Heideggerianism, not the theory as a whole. Rawlsianism, however, includes min-maxing as well, which seems more normative.
If you are behind a veil of ignorance and optimize expected utility under SSA, then you will want the average utility in your universe to be as high as possible.
SIA is a bit more complicated. But we can observe that SIA gives the same posterior predictions if we add extra observers to each universe so they have the same population, and these observers observe something special that indicates they’re an extra observer, and their quality of life is 0 (i.e. they’re indifferent to existing). In this case, someone reasoning behind the veil of ignorance and maximizing expected utility will want total utility to be as high as possible; it’s better for someone to exist iff their personal utility exceeds 0, since they’re replacing an empty observer.
I see that Rawlsianism requires an original position. But such an original position is required for both SSA and SIA. To my mind, the difference is that the SSA original position is just a prior over universes, while the SIA original position includes both a prior over universes and an assumption of subjective existence, which is more likely to be true of universes with high population. Both SSA and SIA agree that you aren’t in an empty universe a priori, but that’s an edge case; SIA scales continuously with population while SSA just has a step from 0 to 1.
Heidegerrianism doesn’t seem to believe in an objective universe in a direct sense, e.g. the being of tools is not the being of the dynamical physical system that a physicalist would take to correspond to the tool, because the tool also has the affordance of using it. So it’s unclear how to reconcile Heideggerianism with anthropics as a whole. I’m speculating on various political correspondences but I don’t see how to get them from Heideggerianism and anthropics, just noting possible similarities in conclusions.
I agree that the min-maxing of Rawlsianism is purely normative. What I was getting at was the veil of ignorance itself. Perhaps, it is worth explicitly saying, “oops, I forgot about that,” for this point.
Yes, I agree. However, I still feel that if you are willing to believe in the veil of ignorance, you should also believe in SIA.
Again, I agree. However, I feel that the veil of ignorance needs both the prior over universes and the prior before the assumption of subjective existence since it is willing to modify existential properties of the observer, without which the observer would not have the same subjective existence.
This is the very reason I believe that it should be OK with the “prior over universes” present in SSA. If reality is not objective, then it is easier to understand this prior as “uncertainty regarding the population of this universe” rather than “the potential of being in another universe which has a different population.” The potential universes and the actual universe become ontologically more similar since they are both non-objective. I have to admit that this is the point I am least certain of, though.