Yeah, so Pareto seems to require that we don’t just think about the people in the universe in terms of set theory as you do, but instead maybe have something like a canonical order in which to compare people between universes… that seems to work for comparing worlds where (roughly) the people are the same but their utilities change; I’m not sure how to compare universes with people arranged differently using something like this set theory. Ideally we could think of infinite utilities as hyperreal numbers rather than in terms of sets; then there’s no contradiction of this form.
I think full agent-neutrality/multisets will make it basically impossible for anything to matter in practice assuming the universe is infinite (maybe you can only care about finite universes, though). You’d need to change the number of individuals at some utility level to make any difference, but if the universe is infinite, the number of individuals at any given utility level is probably infinite, and you probably won’t be able to change its cardinality predictably through normal acts that don’t predictably affect weird possibilities of jumping between different infinite cardinals.
If a hyperreal approach gets past this, then it probably assumes additional structure, effectively an order.
Yeah, so Pareto seems to require that we don’t just think about the people in the universe in terms of set theory as you do, but instead maybe have something like a canonical order in which to compare people between universes… that seems to work for comparing worlds where (roughly) the people are the same but their utilities change; I’m not sure how to compare universes with people arranged differently using something like this set theory. Ideally we could think of infinite utilities as hyperreal numbers rather than in terms of sets; then there’s no contradiction of this form.
I think full agent-neutrality/multisets will make it basically impossible for anything to matter in practice assuming the universe is infinite (maybe you can only care about finite universes, though). You’d need to change the number of individuals at some utility level to make any difference, but if the universe is infinite, the number of individuals at any given utility level is probably infinite, and you probably won’t be able to change its cardinality predictably through normal acts that don’t predictably affect weird possibilities of jumping between different infinite cardinals.
If a hyperreal approach gets past this, then it probably assumes additional structure, effectively an order.