I realize this ship has sailed, but: I continue to be confused about how the non-profit board can justify giving up control. Given that their mandate[1] says that their ‘primary fiduciary duty is to humanity’ and to ensure that AGI ‘is used for the benefit of all’, and given that more control over a for-profit company is strictly better than less control, on what grounds can they justify relinquishing that control?
[EDIT: I realize that in reality they’re just handing over control because Altman wants it, and they’ve been selected in part for willingness to give Altman what he wants. But it still seems like they need a justification, for public consumption and to avoid accusations of violating their charter and fiduciary duty.]
Am I just being insufficiently cynical here? Does everyone tacitly recognize that the non-profit board isn’t really bound by that charter and can do whatever they like? Or is there some justification that they can put forward with a straight face?
Is it maybe something like, ‘We trust that OpenAI the for-profit is primarily dedicated to the general well-being of humanity, and so nothing is lost by giving up control’? (But then it seems like more control is still strictly better in case it turns out that in some shocking and unforeseeable way the for-profit later has other priorities). Or is it, ‘OpenAI the for-profit is doing good in the world, and they can do much more good if they can raise more money, and there’s certainly no way they could raise more money without us giving up control’?
Or is it, ‘OpenAI the for-profit is doing good in the world, and they can do much more good if they can raise more money, and there’s certainly no way they could raise more money without us giving up control’?
Basically, yes, that is what the argument will be. The conditionality of the current investment round is also an example of that: “we can only raise more capital on the condition that we turn ourselves into a normal (B-corp) company, unencumbered by our weird hybrid structure (designed when we thought we would need OOMs less capital than it turns out we do), and free of the exorbitant Board control provisions currently governing PPUs etc. And if we can’t raise capital, we will go bust soon and will become worthless and definitely lose the AGI race, and the Board achieves none of its fiduciary goals at all. Better a quarter of a live OA than 100% of a dead one.”
Possibly too cynical, but I find myself wondering whether the conditionality was in fact engineered by OAI in order to achieve this purpose. My impression is that there are a lot of VCs shouting ‘Take my money!’ in the general direction of OpenAI and/or Altman who wouldn’t have demanded the restructuring.
No, that’s what I think too: they were turning down investors, even, excluding them from the upround. The conditionality was probably not necessary at all. But it does serve a valuable purpose for the inevitable lawsuit.
I agree that that’s presumably the underlying reality. I should have made that clearer.
But it seems like the board would still need to create some justification for public consumption, and for avoiding accusations of violating their charter & fiduciary duty. And it’s really unclear to me what that justification is.
I realize this ship has sailed, but: I continue to be confused about how the non-profit board can justify giving up control. Given that their mandate[1] says that their ‘primary fiduciary duty is to humanity’ and to ensure that AGI ‘is used for the benefit of all’, and given that more control over a for-profit company is strictly better than less control, on what grounds can they justify relinquishing that control?
[EDIT: I realize that in reality they’re just handing over control because Altman wants it, and they’ve been selected in part for willingness to give Altman what he wants. But it still seems like they need a justification, for public consumption and to avoid accusations of violating their charter and fiduciary duty.]
Am I just being insufficiently cynical here? Does everyone tacitly recognize that the non-profit board isn’t really bound by that charter and can do whatever they like? Or is there some justification that they can put forward with a straight face?
Is it maybe something like, ‘We trust that OpenAI the for-profit is primarily dedicated to the general well-being of humanity, and so nothing is lost by giving up control’? (But then it seems like more control is still strictly better in case it turns out that in some shocking and unforeseeable way the for-profit later has other priorities). Or is it, ‘OpenAI the for-profit is doing good in the world, and they can do much more good if they can raise more money, and there’s certainly no way they could raise more money without us giving up control’?
I’m assuming here that their charter is the same as OpenAI’s charter, since I haven’t been able to find a distinct non-profit charter.
Basically, yes, that is what the argument will be. The conditionality of the current investment round is also an example of that: “we can only raise more capital on the condition that we turn ourselves into a normal (B-corp) company, unencumbered by our weird hybrid structure (designed when we thought we would need OOMs less capital than it turns out we do), and free of the exorbitant Board control provisions currently governing PPUs etc. And if we can’t raise capital, we will go bust soon and will become worthless and definitely lose the AGI race, and the Board achieves none of its fiduciary goals at all. Better a quarter of a live OA than 100% of a dead one.”
Possibly too cynical, but I find myself wondering whether the conditionality was in fact engineered by OAI in order to achieve this purpose. My impression is that there are a lot of VCs shouting ‘Take my money!’ in the general direction of OpenAI and/or Altman who wouldn’t have demanded the restructuring.
No, that’s what I think too: they were turning down investors, even, excluding them from the upround. The conditionality was probably not necessary at all. But it does serve a valuable purpose for the inevitable lawsuit.
I believe the confusion comes from assuming the current board follows rules rather than doing whatever is most convenient.
The old board was trying to follow the rules, and the people in question were removed (technically were pressured to remove themselves).
I agree that that’s presumably the underlying reality. I should have made that clearer.
But it seems like the board would still need to create some justification for public consumption, and for avoiding accusations of violating their charter & fiduciary duty. And it’s really unclear to me what that justification is.