I was citing from memory (though I had to do a search to get the page number) because I remembered EY going through the argument of the author who promoted the tickle argument, and then noting with dismay that the author went on to say that it also two-boxes, which is proof of its greatness.
Just now I looked at the paper again, and you’re right that in the section I had in mind (2nd full paragraph on p. 68) doesn’t fully spell out how it reaches that conclusion. But (as I thought) it does have a citation to the author that does spell out the algorithm, which is where you can now go to find the answer. EY does mention that the algorithm is shaky, as it may not even converge, and requires that it update n-th order decisions per some process until it stops changing.
The cited article is not available for free. Also, I’m more interested in the situation with the tickle defense rather than the metatickle defense, because assuming zero capacity for introspection seems like a silly thing to do when formulating a decision theory.
Also, in regards to people claiming that two-boxing on Newcomb’s problem is an advantage for the tickle defense, that seems very strange. What’s the point in avoiding CDT if you’re going to trick yourself into two-boxing anyway?
I think the vanilla tickle-defence still two-boxes on Newcomb’s problem. The logic goes something like:
Apply some introspection to deduce whether you are likely to be a one-boxer or a two-boxer (in the same way that Solomon introspects to see whether he is charismatic) and then use this information to deduce whether the money is in the box. Now you are facing the transparent-box version of the dilemma, in which EDT two-boxes.
Tickle defence works by gradually screening off all non-causal paths emerging from the ‘action’ node while CDT simply ignores them. This means they make decisions based on different information, so they aren’t entirely identical, although they are similar in that they both always choose the dominant strategy when there is one (which incidentally proves that Tickle Defence is not TDT, since TDT does not always choose a dominant strategy).
Oh, I see. I hadn’t even thought about the fact that EDT fails Newcomb’s problem if the prediction is revealed beforehand.
Edit: Wait a minute, I’m not sure that works. The predictor’s decision depends on what your final decision will be, so noting your inclination to one-box or two-box does not completely screen off your final decision from the contents of the box that may or may not contain $1 million.
The transparent Newcomb’s problem is still a fatal flaw in EDT, though.
One could apply the same logic to Solomon’s problem, and say that the difference between charismatic and uncharismatic leaders is that while charismatic leaders may feel tempted to call for someone else’s wife they eventually find a reason not to, while uncharismatic leaders may feel worried about losing power but eventually find a reason why they can still call for another man’s wife without putting themselves at any more risk. In other words normal EDTs are charismatic, tickle-EDTs, CDTs and TDTs are uncharismatic.
Leaving aside the question of how the populace can tell the difference (perhaps we postulate a weaker version of whatever power Omega uses) the final decision logic now goes back to not calling for another man’s wife.
The cited article is not available for free. Also, I’m more interested in the situation with the tickle defense rather than the metatickle defense, because assuming zero capacity for introspection seems like a silly thing to do when formulating a decision theory.
Then I don’t think I have anything to offer on that front.
Also, in regards to people claiming that two-boxing on Newcomb’s problem is an advantage for the tickle defense, that seems very strange. What’s the point in avoiding CDT if you’re going to trick yourself into two-boxing anyway?
That’s exactly the point EY is making: they’re taking their intuitions as supreme and finding out how they can fit the decision theory to the intuitions rather than looking at results and working backward to what decision theories get the good results.
I was citing from memory (though I had to do a search to get the page number) because I remembered EY going through the argument of the author who promoted the tickle argument, and then noting with dismay that the author went on to say that it also two-boxes, which is proof of its greatness.
Just now I looked at the paper again, and you’re right that in the section I had in mind (2nd full paragraph on p. 68) doesn’t fully spell out how it reaches that conclusion. But (as I thought) it does have a citation to the author that does spell out the algorithm, which is where you can now go to find the answer. EY does mention that the algorithm is shaky, as it may not even converge, and requires that it update n-th order decisions per some process until it stops changing.
The cited article is not available for free. Also, I’m more interested in the situation with the tickle defense rather than the metatickle defense, because assuming zero capacity for introspection seems like a silly thing to do when formulating a decision theory.
Also, in regards to people claiming that two-boxing on Newcomb’s problem is an advantage for the tickle defense, that seems very strange. What’s the point in avoiding CDT if you’re going to trick yourself into two-boxing anyway?
I think the vanilla tickle-defence still two-boxes on Newcomb’s problem. The logic goes something like:
Apply some introspection to deduce whether you are likely to be a one-boxer or a two-boxer (in the same way that Solomon introspects to see whether he is charismatic) and then use this information to deduce whether the money is in the box. Now you are facing the transparent-box version of the dilemma, in which EDT two-boxes.
Tickle defence works by gradually screening off all non-causal paths emerging from the ‘action’ node while CDT simply ignores them. This means they make decisions based on different information, so they aren’t entirely identical, although they are similar in that they both always choose the dominant strategy when there is one (which incidentally proves that Tickle Defence is not TDT, since TDT does not always choose a dominant strategy).
Oh, I see. I hadn’t even thought about the fact that EDT fails Newcomb’s problem if the prediction is revealed beforehand.
Edit: Wait a minute, I’m not sure that works. The predictor’s decision depends on what your final decision will be, so noting your inclination to one-box or two-box does not completely screen off your final decision from the contents of the box that may or may not contain $1 million.
The transparent Newcomb’s problem is still a fatal flaw in EDT, though.
One could apply the same logic to Solomon’s problem, and say that the difference between charismatic and uncharismatic leaders is that while charismatic leaders may feel tempted to call for someone else’s wife they eventually find a reason not to, while uncharismatic leaders may feel worried about losing power but eventually find a reason why they can still call for another man’s wife without putting themselves at any more risk. In other words normal EDTs are charismatic, tickle-EDTs, CDTs and TDTs are uncharismatic.
Leaving aside the question of how the populace can tell the difference (perhaps we postulate a weaker version of whatever power Omega uses) the final decision logic now goes back to not calling for another man’s wife.
Then I don’t think I have anything to offer on that front.
That’s exactly the point EY is making: they’re taking their intuitions as supreme and finding out how they can fit the decision theory to the intuitions rather than looking at results and working backward to what decision theories get the good results.